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Abstract 
Although project portfolio management (PPM) has been an active research area over the past 
50 years, budget allocation models that consider competition are sparse.  Firms faced with the 
project portfolio management problem must not only consider their current projections for the 
returns from their projects’ target markets, but must also anticipate that these returns can 
depend significantly on the investment decisions made by their competitors.  In this thesis, we 
develop four Competitive PPM (CPPM) models wherein firms allocate resources between 
multiple projects and project returns are influenced by the actions taken by competitors. 
In the first two CPPM problems, we assume all-or-nothing project investment decisions 
where firms fully commit to either a project targeting a mature or an emerging market and the 
investment amount is fixed (first model) or a decision variable (second model).  In the final 
two CPPM problems, firms have a fixed budget which they allocate in a continuous manner 
between two markets (third model) or multiple markets (fourth model).  The returns each firm 
obtains from investments into these markets are assumed to follow an s-shaped curve (first 
model), the Inada (1963) conditions (third model), or are determined based on linear demand 
functions (second and fourth model). 
In the first model, two competing firms consider investing into two separate projects 
targeting a mature and an emerging market.  We assume that firms have symmetric investment 
opportunities for each market and each firm simultaneously decides whether to invest in the 
mature or the emerging market.  The returns from these markets are assumed to follow an s-
shaped curve and depend on both firms’ investment decision.  We characterize the variety of 
interactions that may emerge in symmetric environments (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma or Game of 
Chicken).  For each game, we outline the CPPM strategy that can offer higher returns by 
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exploiting first-mover advantages, cooperation opportunities and aggressive choices. We also 
discuss the market conditions that lead to these games.   
In the second model, a similar CPPM setting is considered where two symmetric firms face 
two target markets.  However, we assume that demand for the emerging market is uncertain 
and may expand through firms’ market entry (positive diffusion effects), while demand for the 
mature market is known with certainty and cannot expand.  Firms decide when to invest, in 
which market to invest, and how much to invest into this market.  Our analysis reveals that the 
existence of multiple investment opportunities may induce firms to delay their investment even 
in the absence of demand uncertainty, and that high diffusion effects coupled with low demand 
uncertainty can drive firms to invest early even if both firms could increase returns by delaying 
their investment.  We then study the asymmetric case where firms differ with respect to their 
costs and diffusion effects and show some counter-intuitive results. 
In the third CPPM problem, we consider continuous budget allocations and prove that 
while a monopoly firm bases its budget allocation decision solely on the marginal returns of 
the two markets, duopoly firms also account for their average returns from the two markets.  
This drives duopoly firms, in particular the firm with the smaller budget, to invest more heavily 
into the mature market.  We show that as a firm’s budget increases, the share of its budget that 
is invested into the mature market decreases while its competitor’s investment into the mature 
market increases.  This chapter also explores how changes to the market parameters and market 
uncertainty affect the resource allocation decision of firms under competition.  Considering the 
special case of identical budgets, we prove that as the number of competing firms increases 
(with a fixed total budget), firms allocate an even greater share of their budget into the mature 
market. 
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The fourth model considers a general case where a number of budget-constrained firms 
engage in production decisions for multiple markets under competition.  Each firm decides 
how much to produce for each market, subject to its budget constraint.  We prove that firms 
produce greater quantities for markets with higher than average base demand and that these 
quantities are increasing in the number of competitors (assuming identical production 
capacities).  With asymmetric production capacities, we numerically illustrate how firms with 
large production capacities may, instead, increase production into lower than average base 
demand markets.  Furthermore, we characterize the increase in return firms can expect from 
budget increases and conjecture that if some markets are not served by all firms, the remaining 
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Project Management is about doing projects right; 
Portfolio Management is about doing the right projects. 
Cooper et al. (2000) 
Allocating scarce resources over a range of project alternatives is an essential decision that 
all organizations make.  Consequently, the decision that organizations face is not whether to 
engage in Project Portfolio Management (PPM) but how to engage in it.  Approaches to PPM 
vary, ranging from ad-hoc resource allocation decisions by individual managers to formal 
processes that have been adopted throughout all levels of the firm.  Although the success of 
PPM implementations has been mixed, any type of formal PPM process is better than ad-hoc 
decision-making (Cooper et al., 2004).   
PPM was first examined by Lorie and Savage (1955) in the context of a capital budgeting 
problem in which firms choose from a selection of projects with different costs and returns, 
subject to a budget constraint.  They acknowledged the complexity of the problem and used a 
trial-and-error method to obtain solutions to the problem.  A decade later, Petersen (1967) used 
a knapsack formulation to solve the PPM problem and implemented an algorithm to find an 
optimal solution.  However, the complexity of the model and the computational limitations of 
that time restricted him to smaller problems.  Since these early days of PPM, many additional 
features have been incorporated into formal PPM models, including uncertainty with respect to 
project costs and returns, multiple resource constraints and the resulting threats of bottlenecks, 
correlations between projects in terms of both costs and returns, short-term versus long-term 
objectives and the degree to which projects fit the overarching strategy of the firm.  We next 
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provide an illustrative example with the considerations and trade-offs associated with PPM 
problems. 
1.1. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE AND INDUSTRY CASES 
Let us assume that a firm (Firm A) is contemplating how to allocate its R&D budget for the 
upcoming year.  Firms A’s portfolio of projects includes, among others, an incremental project 
targeting a mature market and a radical project targeting an emerging market.  Allocating 
resources across hundreds of possible projects is clearly difficult but even deciding between 
these two projects can be challenging.  Suppose the radical project has a higher expected return 
than the incremental project but it also carries more risk.  In addition, resources for the 
incremental project may be more readily available but the radical project, while more costly, 
may provide a better fit with the current strategy of the firm.  The complexity of this decision 
has been addressed in many ways by academia and industry, yet a fundamental complexity is 
still missing from this description: the effect of competition.  While Firm A is making its PPM 
decisions, its main competitor, Firm B, is contemplating its own portfolio of projects.  Firm B 
may be deciding between two projects that target the same markets as Firm A’s projects.  In 
many instances, the portfolio decisions made by one firm will influence the outcome and 
profits of the other: both firms investing into a mature market can quickly saturate the market 
and lead to disappointing returns while joint entry into an emerging market may enlarge the 
market, resulting in increased profits for both firms. 
There are many industries where two competing firms may be faced with these types of 
trade-offs in their portfolio decisions.  Examples are soft drink firms (e.g., a new packaging 
project vs. a new drink creation project), airline carriers (e.g., a minor route addition vs. a new 
hub placement), and automotive firms (e.g., an interior design modification vs. a new motor 
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development).  Although these examples and the description of possible outcomes are based on 
speculation, it is clear that firms that compete in the same markets will influence each other’s 
returns with their portfolio decisions.  Consequently, competition should influence firms’ 
resource allocation decisions.  We refer to PPM when faced with competition as Competitive 
Project Portfolio Management (CPPM).  CPPM is the focus of this research.  Throughout this 
thesis, we assume that each project in a firm’s project portfolio represents an investment or 
production opportunity for a particular market.  Consequently, we use the terms “investing into 
a project” or “investing into a market” interchangeably. 
Firms that ignored or misjudged the effect of competition in their project selections have 
paid a steep price.  For example, in the early 1980s, Frontier Airlines expanded beyond its 
Denver hub without anticipating the subsequent increase in competition in their core Denver 
market (Bulow et al., 1985).  A decade later, DuPont focused too much of its estimated $2 
billion annual budget on projects aimed at improving existing lines of businesses, thereby 
making itself vulnerable to competitors that focused more on innovative projects 
(BusinessWeek, 2003).   
Other firms made CPPM decisions by paying careful attention to their competitors’ actions.  
For example, by the end of the 1990s PepsiCo specifically sought out markets in which the 
Coca Cola Company was not operating, thereby increasing their international revenue and 
returns dramatically (Yoffie, 2004).  In the Niagara Wine Region of Canada, wineries have 
benefited from other wineries offering competing wine tasting services.  Although this has 
increased competition in the region, the number of wineries in a region is a key driver of 
increasing tourism, thereby expanding the overall market (Getz and Brown, 2006).  While 
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these examples are quite different, it is evident that management of project portfolios needs to 
account for the effects of competition. 
1.2. STRUCTURE OF THESIS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The structure of this thesis is as follows.  Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on PPM.  Chapters 3 – 6 study four different CPPM problems, each written in 
manuscript form and providing their own independent contributions.  The differences between 
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Figure 1.1: Overview of models 
  In Chapters 3 and 4, firms make all-or-nothing project investment decisions into either a 
mature or an emerging market and the investment amount is fixed (Chapter 3) or a decision 
variable (Chapter 4).  In Chapters 5 and 6, firms allocate a fixed budget in a continuous manner 
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between two markets (Chapter 5) or multiple markets (Chapter 6).  We assume that market 
returns follow an s-shaped curve (Chapter 3), the Inada (1963) conditions (Chapter 5), or are 
determined based on linear demand functions (Chapters 4 and 6).  For each of these models, 
we further assume that firms have complete information about the characteristics of each other 
and the markets.  While this is a strong assumption, it is reasonable because firms that compete 
in the same industry often have a similar understanding of the markets and can estimate each 
other’s costs (see Wu and Parlar (2011) for treatment of incomplete cost information). The 
computational analysis for this thesis was completed in Maple and Excel (selected Maple code 
is included in Appendix A).   
In Chapter 3, we study a duopoly in which symmetric firms consider project investment 
opportunities into two separate projects targeting a mature and an emerging market.  Firms are 
constrained to invest in only one of the two markets and the markets provide returns according 
to an s-shaped function.  Considering the case where firms have symmetric project investment 
opportunities, we find that various games may occur between the two firms (such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Game of Chicken) and that, given our assumptions, a pure strategy 
exists for all possible games.  Each of these situations requires a different strategy.  We further 
characterize the market parameters and investment opportunities that lead to particular strategic 
interactions between the two firms.  
To gain insights in the more general case, we conduct a computational analysis where firms 
are constrained by an investment budget and have non-symmetric project investment 
opportunities.  We show that in some instances, a firm may be better off when its competitor’s 
budget increases. 
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In Chapter 4, we examine a setting where two firms are each considering two alternative 
project investments, one targeting a mature market and one an emerging market.  However, in 
this model, demand for the emerging market is uncertain and subject to diffusion effects while 
the demand for the mature market is known with certainty and does not increase through either 
firm’s entry.  Our analysis reveals that the existence of multiple investment opportunities (i.e., 
multiple markets) in the investment portfolio can cause firms to delay their investment even if 
there is little to no demand uncertainty.  This is in contrast to the existing literature which has 
considered a single market, where the strategic position gained from having the first mover 
advantage drives firms to invest early unless there are significant cost advantages to investing 
late or demand uncertainty is significant (Kulatilaka and Perottie, 1998; Swinney et al., 2011). 
Our model also demonstrates that when an emerging market’s high diffusion effect is 
coupled with low demand uncertainty, the competitive dynamics can drive firms to invest too 
early.  Another challenging competitive dynamic can evolve if both firms prefer to invest as a 
monopoly in either market to Cournot investment in the respective other market.  Such 
preferences lead to multiple equilibria and potentially poor outcomes if firms both invest into 
the same market.  Our analysis of the market parameters reveals a key ratio (the difference 
between average demand and unit cost in the mature market divided by the difference between 
average demand and unit cost in the emerging market) that can help managers make timely 
decisions and focus their resources. 
We proceed with numerical illustrations to highlight a number of important findings if 
firms are not symmetric.  In the first scenario, two firms differ with respect to their costs in the 
mature market.  Counterintuitively, a negligent firm that fails to keep its unit cost stable in the 
mature market may improve the dynamics of the game in a way that enables it to receive 
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higher returns than an attentive firm that maintains a low unit cost in both markets.  In the 
second scenario, one of the firms has lower unit costs in both markets while the other firm 
generates stronger diffusion effects in the emerging market.  We find that the latter firm can 
receive higher returns than the former, even if the former has a significant cost advantage in 
both markets. 
In Chapter 5, firms face a continuous resource allocation challenge and must decide how to 
allocate their budget between two projects that target two separate markets.  We first study the 
monopoly benchmark case and proceed with the portfolio decision faced by duopoly firms.  
This allows us to highlight the effect of competition on the PPM decision.  We find that in 
contrast to a monopoly, which bases its decision on the marginal returns of the two markets, 
duopoly firms consider the marginal returns as well as the average returns from the two 
markets.  This leads duopoly firms to invest more heavily into the mature market.  The 
difference in investment strategy implies that duopoly firms receive lower total returns 
compared to a monopoly and that managers that fail to account for these competitive effects 
could harm their potential returns.  This result reveals that under competition, firms have the 
incentive to allocate a greater share of their budget into the market that offers good returns for 
small investments.  The firms get engaged in a seemingly unnecessary competition over their 
share of the mature market, resulting in overinvestment into this market and underinvestment 
into the emerging market, eventually leading to lower combined returns.   
We further demonstrate the effect of firms’ budgets on their investment decision when 
faced with competition.  We first show that the share that a firm invests into the mature market 
is non-increasing in its own budget.  This is quite intuitive, as a firm with a low budget will 
invest fully into the mature market, but, as its budget increases and the mature market 
saturates, it will shift investment into the emerging market.  We then show the effect of the 
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competitor’s budget on the investment decision.  Firms are very sensitive to the size of their 
competitor’s budget if it is small—a small increase in the competitor’s budget can result in a 
large shift of the share of investment from the emerging into mature market.  This is a strong 
defensive reaction aimed at protecting the average return from the mature market.  However, if 
the competitor’s budget is sufficiently high, changes to the competitor’s budget affects firms’ 
resource allocation decision only marginally.  
We also demonstrate that firms may continue to invest significant resources into the 
emerging market even if returns from this market become highly uncertain.  In addition, we 
show how the effect of changes to the rate at which markets become saturated depends on the 
firms’ budget sizes.  We then extend our findings to oligopolies and prove, for the special case 
where all firms have identical budgets, that the greater the number of firms competing, the 
more these firms invest into the project targeting the mature market. 
In Chapter 6, we present a closed-form solution to the constrained resource allocation 
decision where firms are competing against each other in a number of product markets.  Each 
firm has a fixed budget and unit production cost and decides how many units of each product 
to produce, where each product targets a different market.  We assume no substitution effects 
between markets, but within each market the products of all firms are perfect substitutes.  We 
further assume Cournot quantity competition between firms in each of these markets.   
We first consider the symmetric case where all firms have identical production capacities 
(fixed budget / unit production cost) and prove that firms produce more (less) in markets with 
higher (lower) than average base demand, as expected.  Surprisingly, however, production in 
high (low) demand markets increases (decreases) as the number of competitors increases 
(assuming fixed total budget).  While competition always decreases firms’ profits in 
unconstrained production settings, we prove that the competitive effect on firms’ allocation 
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decisions reduces the total industry profits as the number of firms increases, even if total 
industry output is fixed.   
With asymmetric production capacities, the effect of competition is more complex.  We 
numerically illustrate how firms with large capacities may increase production into lower than 
average base demand markets.  Furthermore, we characterize the budget’s shadow price and 
prove that the shadow price is greater the smaller the current capacity of a firm. 
In some circumstances, a particular market demand may be too low to attract investment by 
some firms, in particular by firms with low capacities.  We conjecture that if some markets are 
not served by all firms, the remaining firms reduce their production into these markets 
(compared to a fully served market), taking advantage of the reduction in competition in those 
markets.  We prove this result for an oligopoly setting with three firms and three markets. 
By allowing demand slopes to differ by market and unit production costs to differ by firm 
and target market, we demonstrate how our key findings apply broadly and can illustrate 
certain counter-intuitive behaviour that may arise in more complex situations.  For example, 
we show that an increase in firms’ unit costs can lead to an increase in profits for all firms.  In 
another example, we demonstrate how an increase in demand for a particular market can lead 
to lower profits for firms producing for that market and higher profits for those firms not 
producing for that market.   
In Chapter 7, we conclude this thesis and discuss future directions for this work.   A list of 
notation is available in Appendix B.  PPM has been an active research field over the last 50 
years and we believe that the CPPM research problem still offers many opportunities for new 
contributions that can help decision-makers faced with resource allocation problems.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. AN INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
There is vast literature dedicated to PPM and its tools and methods have been applied to a wide 
range of industries.  In a review paper, Shane and Ulrich (2004) identified the area of PPM as 
the second largest stream of Management Science research within the field of technological 
innovation, product development, and entrepreneurship. Almost every organization must make 
resource allocation decisions between competing projects and with more organizations 
becoming project-oriented the need for PPM tools and methods continues to grow.   
PPM is a challenging problem for organizations for a range of reasons: project returns are 
uncertain and can be hard to estimate (Cooper et al., 2001), allocating scare resources 
efficiently without creating bottlenecks is crucial to success (Adler et al., 1995), correlations 
between projects can affect their cost and return estimates (Loch and Kavadias, 2002), the 
sequence of projects may be important (Kavadias and Loch, 2003), and there are a many 
behavioural issues that affect project portfolio decisions since the outcomes can heavily 
influence the careers of decision-makers (Sanwal, 2007).  On top of these challenges, the 
actions of competitors can heavily influence the outcome of PPM decisions (Zhu and Weyant, 
2003). 
In this literature review, we will describe where PPM has been applied and illustrate its 
strengths and weaknesses.  Subsection 2.2 outlines the key internally focused PPM tools and 
Subsection 2.3 outlines the PPM tools and methods that are externally focused and consider the 
effect of competition. 
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2.1.1. AREAS OF APPLICATION 
Although there is a need for PPM in nearly every organization, some industries are particularly 
suitable candidates for a PPM implementation.  Such industries can be characterized as being 
heavily project-based, where these projects have benefits that are hard to measure, pose 
significant risks and the number of potential projects generally exceeds the available budget.  
Unsurprisingly, PPM tools and methods were first developed and employed by such industries. 
Perhaps the first area that witnessed a broad application of PPM was the information 
technology sector.  ITPM (information technology portfolio management) was first introduced 
by McFarlan (1981) but has since garnered significant attention from academia (see for 
example Bardhan et al., 2004).  The IT sector was a suitable candidate because the benefits of 
IT projects are often hard to quantify yet the costs of IT projects are large, forcing 
organizations to make tough choices on which IT projects to implement and which ones to 
defer or decline. 
Another massive application area is the pharmaceutical industry (see for example Blau et 
al., 2004).  Pharmaceutical companies are constantly weighing off competing projects 
progressing down their R&D pipeline.  Similar to the IT sector, these projects are very 
expensive, the eventual return is highly uncertain, and due to resource constraints, not every 
idea or prototype can be further developed. 
PPM decisions are not only crucial at the strategic level but are equally important at the 
operational level.  For example, Loch et al. (2001) applied their PPM methodology to the 
transmission predevelopment group at BMW in Munich, Germany.  In their case study, the 
transmission group had to select among new technologies and improvements to current 
technologies to develop the new year-2000 powertrains.  Each technology proposal represented 
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a project with its own distinct potential benefits and challenges.  Choosing the right 
combination of these projects was crucial for developing an efficient, high-quality transmission 
system. 
2.1.2. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PPM 
In a broad survey of business units, Cooper et al. (2004) discovered that top performing 
business units (in terms of NPD success and profitability) were eight times more likely to have 
implemented a formal and systematic portfolio management process compared to poorly 
performing business units.  It is generally recognized that PPM leads to better resource 
allocation, closer alignment of projects and overarching business goals, better communication 
between groups within organizations and generally higher profitability (Sanwal, 2007; Cooper 
et al., 2001).  
In spite of these benefits, PPM tools and methods have not been consistently implemented 
in industry. Although successful business units are much more likely to have a formal PPM 
process in place than their less successful counterparts, the actual percentage of successful 
business units with a formal PPM process is only 31% (Cooper et al., 2004).  This lack of PPM 
implementation has been widely recognized (e.g., Schmidt and Freeland, 1992; Loch et al., 
2001).  The need for attention to project portfolio and resource allocation decisions has been 
highlighted by Krishnan and Loch (2005) in a retrospective look at Production and Operations 
Management articles on new product development. 
Since the first paper on PPM by Lorie and Savage (1955), many new tools and methods 
have been developed and proposed both by academia and by industry, each with their own set 
of strengths and weaknesses.  Some rely on highly uncertain financial data, others reduce real 
world complexities aggressively, and others are easily manipulated by decision-makers.  The 
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inherent problem with PPM tools and methods is very clearly illustrated by a study conducted 
by Wind et al. (1983).  They demonstrated that project recommendations can vary significantly 
depending on the PPM tool used to make a project selection.  In their study of 15 business units 
of a large Fortune 500 multinational industrial firm, only 1 out of 15 projects was consistently 
identified as a clearly worthwhile project to pursue. 
2.2. INTERNALLY FOCUSED TOOLS AND METHODS 
As the research area matured, the methodologies used to analyze PPM branched into two 
distinct paths: qualitative and quantitative approaches.  The former path has experienced the 
development of qualitative tools and methods which combine financial data with other aspects, 
such as strategic fit of projects.  These developments aim for a more complete characterization 
of individual projects.  The quantitative research stream addresses shortcomings of early PPM 
models by capturing further mathematical complexities.  However, both branches remained 
focused on firm-internal aspects of the decision and did not consider competition.   
Subsection 2.2.1 describes the key qualitative tools and methods that have been developed and 
Subsection 2.2.2 focuses on quantitative PPM tools and methods. 
2.2.1. QUALITATIVE TOOLS AND METHODS 
A great number of qualitative tools and methods for PPM have been developed.  Due to space 
constraints, we will only highlight some of the key tools that are most commonly applied and 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses identified by Cooper et al. (2001), who provide an 
excellent review of a large number of qualitative PPM tools and methods. 
One very common tool is the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 2001), where 
managers score projects on a number of individual dimensions such as project return, risk, 
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strategic fit, resource requirements, and technological complexity.  By summing the rankings, a 
total score is calculated for each project which then allows for easy comparison between 
projects.  Due to the simplicity of the method, it is popular in industry; however, the final score 
is susceptible to bias by the managers that rank the projects.  Furthermore, this method ignores 
balance within the portfolio (e.g., between innovative products vs. improvements products). 
One PPM tool that is specifically targeted at establishing a well balanced project portfolio 
is the two-dimensional matrix, originally developed by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in 
the early 1970s (Ghemawat, 2002).  First called the “Growth-Share Matrix” by BCG, this 
method was later adapted to PPM and individual projects were mapped onto a matrix using a 
wide range of dimensions such as risk vs. reward (Blau et al., 2004), project structure vs. 
technology level (McFarlan, 1981), and technological attractiveness vs. technological 
competitiveness (Jolly, 2003).  These matrices are popular with managers because they bring 
clarity to a complex problem and are focused on balancing the portfolio.  However, managers 
can easily be overloaded with too many graphs and this effect is exacerbated by the fact that 
these maps do not lead to a clear recommendation on which projects to pursue or terminate. 
For organizations that want to enforce a balance of projects that match their broader 
organizational goals, the strategic bucket method of PPM was developed (Cooper et al., 2001).  
This method is comprised of three steps: first, strategic buckets are defined such as “radical 
products”, “incremental product improvements”, and “maintenance products”. Second, 
resources are allocated between these buckets. And lastly, all projects in the firm’s portfolio 
are allocated to the appropriate bucket and the project portfolio of each bucket is optimized by 
choosing the most suitable project candidates until the resources of the strategic bucket have 
been exhausted.  In spite of its popularity in industry, the strategic bucket method forces many 
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tough decisions on managers who must select appropriate buckets, distribute available 
resources over these buckets, and finally optimize projects portfolios within those buckets. 
2.2.2. QUANTITATIVE TOOLS AND METHODS 
Another set of researchers tried to address shortcomings of early PPM models by adding 
further mathematical complexities.  Initially, economic and financial models of PPM used net 
present value (NPV) (Chun, 1994; Sharpe and Keelin, 1998).  Although these models aim to 
maximize the future return of projects, they do not work well in all situations, particularly 
when financial data is not available or uncertain (Dickinson et al., 2001).  
In response to criticism of the initial financial models, PPM tools and methods were 
expanded to more accurately reflect real world complexities.  One of the first extensions was 
the consideration of risk of the individual projects as well as the risk preference of the 
decision-maker (Brandon, 2006; Graves and Ringuest, 1991).  A further complexity of the 
PPM problem is that the cost of a particular project can depend on decisions made about other 
projects.  For example, if two projects require the same resource, procurement may get volume 
discounts when purchasing this resource.  Loch and Kavadias (2002) have created a model that 
takes such correlations into account.  Chun (1994) made the point that the timing of tasks 
within projects is crucial and that these need to be considered when making PPM decision.  For 
example, if two projects have tasks that can be streamlined effectively, this should be 
recognized as an advantage when choosing which projects to pursue. 
Another major branch of PPM models focuses on the timing of decisions when making 
project selection choices.  Researchers have drawn analogies between financial options (such 
as stock options) and the project selection process, coining the term Real Options (Bardhan et 
al., 2004; Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  In a real options framework, a 
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small investment can be made towards a particular project to “keep the project alive”.  Should 
market conditions evolve favourably, the project can then be pursued fully and large profits can 
be made.  If market conditions are poor, the project can be terminated and the small initial 
investment is lost.  Another PPM approach focuses on the timing of decision by using decision 
trees (Brandon, 2006; Zhu and Weyant, 2003). 
These additional complexities led to the need for more sophisticated mathematical 
programming and optimization techniques for PPM, including mixed integer programs 
(Beaujon et al., 2001), non-linear integer programs (Dickinson et al., 2001) and dynamic 
programming techniques (Loch and Kavadias, 2002).  These mathematical programming 
techniques have been applied in a number of organizations (Schmidt and Freeland, 1992; Loch 
et al., 2001) but are not widely used (Loch et al., 2001).  Just as the simple NPV models, 
sophisticated mathematical models tend to rely heavily on financial data (Cooper et al., 2001).  
The reliance on estimates is particularly concerning as these models lack robustness: small 
changes in the inputs (e.g., the expected return of a project) can have large effects on the 
solution provided by the mathematical optimization technique.  The lack of transparency and 
the complexity of these models make decision-makers hesitant to fully trust the model 
recommendations.  Although many of these complex economic and financial models have gone 
beyond merely considering expected return of projects, one of the critical challenges of the 
PPM problem is that decision-makers are often pursuing more than one objective. 
To address this need, multi-criteria decision making tools and methods were developed that 
consider multiple objectives simultaneously, such as revenue maximization, risk minimization, 
matching existing resources and competencies with project selection, and choosing projects 
that align with the stated broad strategy of an organization. 
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One method of comparing projects based on multiple criteria is to represent each aspect of 
the decision by a utility function.  However, creating utility functions is difficult and has some 
of the same drawbacks as the balanced scorecard in terms of its vulnerability to biased 
decision-makers.  Another way to reduce the complexity of this multi-criteria problem is the 
use of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) that decomposes the PPM decision into smaller 
sub-problems.  This approach allows decision-makers to more easily compare projects and has 
thus been widely applied to PPM (Saaty, 1994).  However, the implementation of AHP is time 
intensive and can lead to bad decisions (Cheng et al., 2002). 
2.3. EXTERNALLY FOCUSED TOOLS AND METHODS 
In the research noted so far, competitive forces are only captured implicitly or in passing.  
Some qualitative tools can capture the impact of competition: for example, the balanced 
scorecard could easily include a category in which managers are asked to rate the expected 
aggression level of competitors’ actions.  In the previously described quantitative tools, 
competition has only been considered implicitly: for example, risk can be thought to include 
the risk of some form of negative competitive response.  However, none of these tools consider 
strategic interactions between competitors explicitly.  To date, the field of externally focused, 
quantitative tools and methods for project portfolio management remains understudied – 
notable exceptions are described below. 
2.3.1. MULTIDIMENSIONAL  KNAPSACK PROBLEMS 
Multidimensional knapsack problems (MKP), a more general form of the standard 0-1 
knapsack problem, have many applications within PPM.  For example, the standard PPM 
knapsack problem of maximizing revenue subject to a budget constraint could be expanded to 
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a multidimensional PPM knapsack problem in which revenue is maximized subject to a 
financial budget and a manpower resource constraint.  However, few MKP have been applied 
to strategic decision with multiple decision makers.  See Freville (2004) for an excellent review 
of MKP.  
Meier et al. (2001) apply a knapsack formulation to a situation with multiple possible states 
(or scenarios).  Using their model, external forces could be considered by treating these states 
as different levels of competitive response.  However, this does not allow for strategic 
interactions in which multiple decision-makers are influencing each others choices.  A recent 
paper by Gibson et al. (2009) considers competitive actions more explicitly.  In their model, 
multiple decision-makers make sequential decisions on how to allocate their resources over 
indivisible objects.  This multidimensional knapsack problem is very hard to solve to 
optimality and the authors are forced to simulate the actions of competitors and then apply an 
efficient search heuristic to find good solutions.  Although this problem is close to the PPM 
problem, it differs in that as soon as one decision-maker chooses a particular object (or 
project), this object is no longer available to the competition.  One could argue that the first-
mover advantage in certain product categories would have a similar effect by basically 
removing the incentive of the other firm to pursue the same project; however, their framework 
is generally more suitable to their own example, namely a sports draft: teams have a certain 
budget to spend on new players of various costs and as soon as one team chooses a player, that 
player is off the market.   
Apart from this pioneering paper, little has been done on the multidimensional knapsack 
problem with multiple decision-makers.  Even the very comprehensive book on knapsack 
problems by Kellerer et al. (2004) does not make reference to any such model.  This is perhaps 
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an expression of how difficult even the single decision-maker multidimensional knapsack 
problem is. 
2.3.2. REAL OPTIONS WITH COMPETITION 
In the field of real options, some attempts have been made to include competitive forces.  
Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) analyzed a duopoly setting where firms trade-off the benefit of 
delaying investment until uncertainty is resolved with the advantage of investing early and 
becoming the leader in the market.  They showed that, contrary to earlier work on real options, 
an increase in market uncertainty does not necessarily increase the benefit of delaying 
investment.  Their work has been extended in multiple ways, such as in the asymmetric 
information case where firms’ knowledge of the market uncertainties varies (Zhu and Weyant, 
2003), and the analysis of the particular dynamics when an established firm competes with a 
start-up firm, where the former firm maximizes returns and the latter firm maximizes its 
probability of survival (Swinney et al., 2011). 
Although this problem framework is directly embedded in resource allocations towards 
new products, the decision evolves around a single market.  However, in a PPM problem, firms 
are considering how to allocate resources between multiple projects that may compete in 
different markets. 
2.3.3. MULTIPRODUCT AND MULTIMARKET COMPETITION 
Tangential to the operations research literature on PPM, multiple papers in the economics 
literature have addressed the resource allocation decision where firms decide how much to 
invest (or produce) in multiple markets.  Analogous to the PPM problem, each target market 
can be viewed as a separate project.  Although most models of competition in the economic 
literature have focused on single-market settings, the lack of multiproduct or multimarket 
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models was noted early by Brander and Eaton (1984).  They focused on the demand effects, 
noting that “interactions between demand for different products, and the associated strategic 
effects, are important determinants of the products a single firm will produce.”  They found 
that firms may produce very similar products as a strategic preemptive move to keep 
competition out of their market.  However, they also showed that the threat of increased 
competition can drive firms to invest in distant product substitutes to increase competition for 
potential entrants who may be contemplating entering markets with new products.  Bulow, 
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) further revealed the complex effects of competition in a 
multiproduct setting by demonstrating how a firm’s opportunity in one market may influence 
its competitor’s action in unrelated markets in surprising ways.  For example, a firm whose 
competitor experiences an increase in demand in one of its markets may experience higher 
profits even if it is not itself competing in the market with increased demand; meanwhile, the 
competitor who is experiencing an increase in demand in one of its market may actually realize 
lower profits than before.  Bulow et al. (1985) note that key factors in these dynamics are 
whether products are “strategic substitutes” or “strategic complements”.  The focus on product 
differentiation was continued by Dobson and Waterson (1996), who refined this approach by 
distinguishing between intraproduct and interproduct rivalry.  The former captures the degree 
to which retailers’ products are viewed as independent or close substitutes, while the latter 
categorizes how similar the products that are sold in the same store are perceived, ranging from 
substitutes, to demand-unrelated, to complements.  Their key contribution was to demonstrate 
that the extent of competition directly influences the degree of product diversification.  This is 
complementary to the traditional view that the level of diversification that firms exhibit is 
mainly driven by risk sharing and asset utilization. 
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Shaked and Sutton (1990) argued that substitutability has two distinct impacts.  First, an 
“expansion effect” is brought about by the demand for a new product minus the loss of sales 
from existing products, and a “competition effect” is caused by new entrants.  Similar to other 
work (Brander and Eaton, 1984; Dobson and Waterson, 1996), they developed a two stage 
model where firms first decide which products to produce and subsequently set the quantity 
and price of the selected products.  They asserted that by modeling the expansion and 
competition effect explicitly, more intuitive results can be attained.  Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990) pointed out that earlier research on industrial behaviour had focused on internal features 
of a particular market such as demand condition, concentration, and barriers-to-entry, without 
considering important external factors to that market.  They demonstrated that multimarket 
contact between firms increases collusive behaviour of firms.  Another contribution was 
brought forward by Zhang and Zhang (1996), who established stability conditions for the 
Cournot-Nash equilibria in the multiproduct case, highlighting that without these conditions 
the Nash equilibria may not predict firms’ actions accurately. 
A few decades after the onset of research on multiproduct firms, Johnson and Myatt (2006) 
found that only limited progress had been made in understanding competition among 
multiproduct firms.  Following their previous work (Johnson and Myatt, 2003), they modeled 
an “upgrade approach” where product lines are differentiated by quality levels, rather than 
actual products.  Through this formulation they were able to demonstrate that many results 
from the single product setting hold in the multiproduct setting as well.  However, they 
acknowledged that their findings were based on a single product with differing quality levels 
and that the effect of competition on the production of different products is far more complex. 
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Bulow et al. (1985) noted that their work on multiproduct oligopolies can be applied to 
areas such as royalties and license fees, international trade, natural resource markets, and – 
“most obvious[ly]” – to product portfolio selection.  In a product portfolio selection context 
(which is akin to the PPM problem), firms decide which product to produce and in which 
quantity to produce those products, while considering competition.  A key characteristic of this 
problem—which is missing in the previously mentioned literature—is that firms are subject to 
production constraints and need to allocate their limited resources in the most efficient way.  
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that addresses our proposed problem is by Laye 
and Laye (2008), who noted that “despite the simplicity of this setting, this problem is not 
solved analytically in the literature” and further stated that solutions to the problem are “not a 
priori obvious”.  Laye and Laye (2008) proved the existence of a unique capacity constrained 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium by transforming the model into a transportation problem 
formulation; however, they did not explore the properties of the solution. 
2.3.4. INNOVATION CONTESTS, ALL-PAY AUCTIONS AND R&D RACES 
Another approach to solving the resource allocation problem while considering competition 
comes from the field of innovation contests, all-pay auctions and R&D races.  In innovation 
contests, firms engage in R&D ‘experiments’ and the firm with the best resulting product wins 
a prize (Boudreau et al., 2011).  Similar to the PPM problem, firms must decide how many 
resources to invest in these projects.  However, innovation contests are centered on a single 
project and thus do not include the type of trade-off decisions required between projects in the 
PPM problem. 
In a more abstract sense, innovation contests can be seen as all-pay auctions.  In an all-pay 
auction, all players place a certain bid, the highest bidder wins but all bidders must pay their 
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bid (Baye et al., 1996).  Analogously, in innovation contests all players expend resources 
developing their prototype (submitting their bid), the best innovation wins the prize (highest 
bid wins), yet the expended resources of all players are non-refundable (all players pay their 
bid).  The all-pay auction literature typically focuses on finding equilibrium states and 
measuring expected revenue.  Baye et al. (1996) demonstrate that with more than two players, 
a continuum of asymmetric equilibria exists and that the revenue equivalence theorem does not 
hold in this case.  Boudreau (2011) shows that restricting bids to discrete amounts can be 
advantageous to all involved parties. 
R&D races are similar to innovation contests and all-pay auctions except that players are 
racing to secure a patent (Harris and Vickers, 1985; Grossman and Shapiro, 1987).  Examples 
of R&D races can be found in the pharmaceutical industry where multiple firms are racing to 
develop a new drug.  The first company to successfully claim a patent secures the complete 
market while the other firms are forced to abandon their efforts, losing their investments to 
date.  Grossman and Shapiro develop a dynamic model that shows how incumbents try to 
prevent challengers from securing patents and model this defence as a series of small bids (or 
investments in R&D) that depend on competitive action.   
Although innovation contests, all-pay auctions and R&D races consider resource allocation 
in the context of competition on R&D type projects, each firm only has one project and these 
projects are competing in the same market.  Furthermore, the winner takes all: the non-winning 
firms lose their investment or bid and receive nothing in return.   
The exception in this research stream is the paper by Ali et al. (1993) who more directly 
work in a PPM framework.  In their model, two firms compete with each other and each firm 
has a portfolio of projects to choose from.  This portfolio consists of two projects: one of Type 
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A (pioneering product) and one of Type B (modification product).  Firms must decide which 
project to invest in and their payoff will depend on each other’s decision as well as the timing 
of their decision.  While they are alone in the market, they derive monopolistic profits; when 
their competitor joins the market, they derive duopolistic profits.  These duopolistic profits will 
depend on whether they invested in the same type of project or not.  Furthermore, there is 
technical uncertainty which affects the duration of time for a successful project completion.  
On average, pioneering projects are expected to take longer than modification products but in 
any particular instance, the reverse could occur.  Ali et al. were unable to express the Nash 
equilibrium in closed form and thus used a numeric analysis to derive insights into the 
problem.  Their analysis is very comprehensive and examines a wide range of possible 
scenarios to establish the effect on equilibria and to provide optimal strategies under a wide 
range of scenarios.  However, their work is also focused on a single market setting.   
Gerchak and Parlar (1999) also focused on R&D races and developed a model that 
considers more than two projects.  In their case, firms allocate their budget over the range of 
available projects in a continuous manner.  Given the setting of an R&D race, they assume a 
“winner takes all” framework where investments into a project increase the likelihood of 
securing a market, thereby excluding the competition from that market.  Finally, Selove (2010) 
proposed a dynamic investment model in which duopoly firms compete in two market 
segments and decide in which segment to invest.  Selove assumed that market returns are 
increasing and that due to small random fluctuations, each firm will initially achieve a higher 
return in different markets.  His framework offers an explanation for why firms focus on 
different markets and continue to invest in markets where they have already established their 
presence.  As described by Selove, there are markets that provide increasing returns due to, for 
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example, reputation effects or learning curves; however, many markets provide decreasing 
returns. 
2.4. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS 
As demonstrated by the broadness of this literature review, the project portfolio management 
problem has attracted interest from many different researchers.  In spite of the large amount of 
literature on this topic, a significant gap exists: most of the quantitative models of PPM do not 
consider competitive forces.  Furthermore, existing work on PPM models with competition has 
focused on special cases, such as single market settings and winner-takes-all models.  PPM 
models where firms compete in multiple markets and those market returns depend on 
competitive actions are scarce.   
The need for more work on CPPM models has been addressed by multiple authors.  As 
early as the 1990s, Weinberg (1990) acknowledged the need for resource allocation models 
that include competitive response.  Bower and Gilbert (2005) agreed that “to date, the potential 
for linkage [between external players and success] to work on resource allocation process has 
not been exploited” (p. 19).  Zhu and Weyant (2003) emphasized that competitive forces are 
critical to the PPM model.  And in their recent review and agenda for Marketing Science on the 
topic or research and innovation, Hauser et al. (2006) declared that a major research challenge 
is “merging game-theoretic ideas with the real challenges in selecting a line of complex 
products” (p. 698). 
In this thesis, we demonstrate how dramatically competition can impact the PPM decisions 
of firms, often in surprising ways.  In the next chapter, we begin with a model where two firms 
decide which of two projects to fund and demonstrate that—even in this simple setting—
competition can add significant complexity to the PPM decision. 
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3. CPPM: BINARY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
In this chapter, we study a duopoly in which firms consider project investment opportunities 
into two projects targeting, separately, a mature and an emerging market.  Projects are assumed 
to have a fixed investment requirement and firms are resource constrained, restricting them to 
invest in only one of the two markets.  Consequently, the key decision faced by the firms is 
whether to invest into the mature or into the emerging market. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 3.1 we develop a CPPM model for the 
symmetric case where firms have equally sized project opportunities.  Using this model, we 
provide the optimal CPPM decisions under a range of market dynamics in Section 3.2, discuss 
our findings in Section 3.3 and describe other possible market states in Section 3.4.  In  
Section 3.5 we provide some numerical results from a CPPM model where firms have non-
symmetric project opportunities and in Section 3.6 we draw conclusions from our work on the 
binary investment case. 
3.1. THE MODEL 
We study a duopoly in which the firms consider investments in projects targeting two markets.  
Each firm n (where n = 1, 2) has a portfolio with two project alternatives, one targeting each 
market.  Firm n,  2,1n , has project investment opportunity of Pn,s to pursue a project 
targeting Market s, where  EMs , .  We assume that each project has a well developed 
business case with a fixed required investment and thus take Pn,s as given.  Firms are faced 
with the strategic decision of selecting only one of the two projects.  This type of restriction is 
often the consequence of budget limits and other resource constraints.  In our game-theoretical 
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model, each firm seeks to invest in the project that maximizes its return, given the portfolio of 
its competitor. 
3.1.1. MARKET PARAMETERS 







sns Pz   is the total 
investment by both firms into market s.  We assume that f is s-shaped: investing more heavily 
into a market is initially associated with economies of scale – in this range, returns convexly 
increase in z; after a tipping point is reached, larger projects are associated with decreasing 
returns to scale as the market becomes saturated – returns concavely increase in z within this 
range.  The s-shape of the diffusion of new products has been widely shown empirically 
(Mahajan and Wind, 1986) and has been previously applied to the PPM problem (Savin and 
Terwiesch, 2005).  Typically, the s-shape relates to cumulative sales or demand for a product 
over time but it has also been used to model the return on product investment within a project 
portfolio management setting (Agrah and Geunes, 2009). 
Using an s-shaped return function in a PPM setting implies the following two assumptions: 
first, projects never incur a negative return.  Indeed, firms typically only maintain projects in 
their portfolio that have an expected positive return; second, returns experience diminishing 
returns for large investments but not declining returns due to over-investment.  Overinvestment 
into a market can lead to falling returns and eventually even negative returns; however, we 
assume that only profitable projects are considered in a firm’s project portfolio.   







 , where as is the maximum return potential of market s and bs determines the 
inflection point (which is bs/2).  We assume that one of the markets is mature and the other 
emerging, where the emerging market has both a higher overall return and a later inflection 
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point than the mature market.  As depicted in Figure 3.1, the mature Market M promises quick 
returns for small projects (such as adding a feature to an existing product) but quickly becomes 
saturated.  Conversely, the emerging Market E can provide substantial returns for large projects 
but a significant project investment is required to develop the market.  Firms face interesting 
tradeoffs between harvesting the mature market (but risking overinvestment) or building the 
emerging market (but risking exploitation). 
   
Figure 3.1: Market Characteristics 
3.1.2. CPPM DECISIONS 
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This formulation of our CPPM model captures significant real world complexity in a 
compact form.  In particular, if firms invest in projects that target the same market within the 
convex part of the market return curve, they experience higher returns than if they entered that 
market alone.  This is a reflection of the fact that competition can increase category credibility, 
thereby aiding diffusion (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989).  However, if firms invest in projects 
that target the same market within the concave part of the market return curve, they experience 
lower returns compared to sole entry into the market.  Such decreasing returns from 
competitive market entry are common in mature markets. 
For tractability, we assume that firms have identical investment opportunities for each 
market, i.e., P1,M = P2,M = PM and P1,E = P2,E = PE.  While this is a special case, duopolies often 
tend to match one another’s moves (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006) and may thus have similar 
projects in their portfolio.  In Section 3.5 we study the case where firms have non-symmetric 
project investment opportunities.  Here, we set ME aa and ME bb  with 1,  .  In 
other words, α and β capture the relative differences in the return potentials and inflection 
points, respectively, of the market return functions of the mature and emerging markets.  The 
firms’ returns are shown in Table 3.1 and for simplicity we define firm i’s strategy vi,M = 1 as 


















































Table 3.1: Returns of symmetric firms 
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3.2. POTENTIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FIRMS 
Using the returns from Table 3.1, we can derive the possible Nash equilibria of the project 
selection decision.  We take a normative/prescriptive approach to analyzing the potential 
interactions between firms.  Under the normative framework, we assume firms are fully 
informed of the potential returns and are rational decision-makers.  Under the prescriptive 
framework, we recognize that firms compete with each other over extended periods: although 
firms are unlikely to face the identical project selection at a future point of time, past portfolio 
decisions will influence their competitor’s perceptions of their likely future strategies.  
Furthermore, we assume that firms’ utilities may be influenced by matters above and beyond 
their project returns.  For example, a firm may prefer slightly lower project returns if this 
results in drastically lower returns for its key competitor. 
  In a PPM setting, mixed strategies in which players make their project selection randomly, 
based on a fixed probability, are not realistic.  Mixed strategies would imply that managers set 
probabilities with which they want to pursue certain projects and then role the dice to make 
their actual choice.  Consequently, we focus on pure strategies in this chapter.  Though finding 
Nash equilibira (NE) can be challenging in itself (Savani and Stengel, 2006), we further argue 
that the analysis should go beyond calculating the pure-strategy NE and that the structure of the 
individual outcomes must be characterized in more detail; otherwise, significant complexity of 
the nature of the interaction is lost.  Consider, for example, the two instances presented in  
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.  In both games, the NE is [E, E] and the returns are [3, 3].  
Structurally, however, the games are quite distinct.  In Example Game 1 (Table 3.2), the NE 
represents the best outcome possible for both players.  By contrast, Example Game 2  
(Table 3.3) is a form of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport, 1980).  Although neither 
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player can improve from [3, 3] unilaterally, this outcome is not Pareto-efficient and both 





M 0 , 0 1 , 2 
E 2 , 1 3 , 3 





M 6 , 6 0 , 10 
E 10 , 0 3 , 3 
Table 3.3: Example Game 2 in cardinal form 
To facilitate the analysis, we represent the potential interactions between firms in ordinal 
form.  Any cardinal 2x2 game can be represented as an ordinal 2x2 game by ranking the 
outcomes from the highest payoff, 4, to the lowest payoff, 1 (Fraser, 1994).  For example,  
Table 3.4 shows Game 2 (from Table 3.3) in ordinal form and all the dynamics of Game 2 in 






M 3 , 3 1 , 4 
E 4 , 1 2 , 2 
 Table 3.4: Example Game 2 in ordinal form 
For all possible CPPM interactions, we have the following results: 
Theorem 3.1: In a duopoly market where firms have two identical project 
opportunities at least one pure-strategy equilibrium exists. 
All proofs appear in Section 3.7. 
In this symmetric game, only six payoff comparisons are required to characterize any 
possible  ordinal  game.  We  first  derive  the  condition  under  which  both  firms  prefer  lone  
investment into mature Market M,        MMMEMMEM ,,and,, 2211   .  Using 















PP  .   Note that MP  is greater 
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than the inflection point, 
2
Mb .  Thus, as bM increases, a greater project investment opportunity 
into the mature market must be taken to justify lone investment into the mature market.  
Particularly, the project opportunity must be greater than the inflection point of the market 





P   as the maximum project investment size into 
the emerging market that justifies joint investment into the emerging market by both firms.  
Based on MP  and EP , the investment space is segmented into four quadrants, as depicted in 
Figure 3.2.  We first focus our analysis on State 1, where firms prefer to harvest the mature 
Market M alone but would like their competitor to help diffusion in the emerging Market E.  
Others have recognized the importance of this state; e.g., Shankar et al. (1998) analyzed the 
game between a pioneer and a late mover where the competitor could help or hinder diffusion 
of the product.  The other states are briefly discussed in Section 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.2: Four possible states of sole vs. joint market entry 
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Let us start the analysis of State 1 with the case where firms consider an investment of size 
MM PP   into the mature market and a minimal investment 0EP into the emerging market.  
This instance is represented by the ordinal game of Convergence (Hamburger, 1979).  Given 
the assumptions of State 1, π1[E, E] > π1[E, M] and π1[M, E] > π1[M, M], and since 0EP , 
we have π1[M, M] > π1[E, E].  Due to symmetry, this fully characterizes the game (Table 3.5).  
The game of Convergence has a NE at [M, M] which is also the Pareto-optimal outcome of this 
game.  Pursuing Project M leads to either the highest or second highest return (depending on 






M 3 , 3 4 , 1 
E 1 , 4 2 , 2 
Table 3.5: Game of Convergence in ordinal form 





















M 2 , 2 4 , 1 
E 1 , 4 3 , 3 
 Table 3.6: The Prisoner’s Dilemma in ordinal form 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has the same NE as the game of Convergence [M, M], yet the 
outcome is much less predictable.  For example, the outcome [E, E] Pareto-dominates [M, M] 
as both players receive a higher return in [E, E].  However, [E, E] is an unstable outcome in the 
sense that both firms can achieve higher returns by deviating to Project M.  Recommendations 
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have been made how the Pareto-optimal outcome in the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be reached in 
repeated games (Rapoport, 1980). 
If firms have an even more significant project for the emerging market, two possible games 
could emerge: the Game of Chicken or the Stag Hunt.  The former (Table 3.7) occurs if 










































M 1 , 1 4 , 2 
E 2 , 4 3 , 3 





M 2 , 2 3 , 1 
E 1 , 3 4 , 4 
Table 3.8: The Stag Hunt in ordinal form 
Both games have two NE: however, in the Stag Hunt (Oye, 1985) the NE in [E, E] 
dominates the NE in [M, M] whereas the Game of Chicken (Rapoport and Chammah, 1966) 
does not have a dominant NE.  Both games are hard to predict and the outcome can be 
influenced by other strategic considerations.  Although the Stag Hunt has a dominant NE  
[E, E], a firm can strategically reduce the return of the other firm by choosing Project M.  
Furthermore, fearing a competitor defection to M, a firm may initiate defection to M to prevent 
receiving its lowest possible return.  In the Game of Chicken, the two NE are [M, E] and  
[E, M].  One could argue that the first-mover decides the outcome of this game: for example, if 
Firm 1 chooses Project M, then Firm 2’s best action is to choose Project E.  Therefore, Firm 1 
can secure the highest possible return for itself, π1[M, E] by irrevocably committing first to 
35 
Project M.  However, this outcome is particularly frustrating for Firm 2.  Not only does Firm 2 
receive the second worst possible return, its rival is receiving the highest possible return.  
Consequently, Firm 2 may be driven to choose Project M as well, leading to the worst possible 
outcome for both firms [M, M].  Experiments have confirmed this danger (Rapoport and 
Chammah, 1966). 
With an even larger project opportunity into the emerging market, the game evolves into 
the game of Spite (Hamburger, 1979).  The game of Spite (Table 3.9) occurs once both (3.2) 
and (3.3) hold.  Spite has a single NE in [E, E] and this outcome provides the highest return for 
both firms.  Firms can deviate to M to punish the other firm but this strategy is much less  
effective than in the Stag Hunt because the other firm still receives the third highest return.  
Furthermore, if both try to punish each other, the game results in the worst possible outcome 





M 1 , 1 3 , 2 
E 2 , 3 4 , 4 
Table 3.9: Game of Spite in ordinal form 
With an even greater project investment for the emerging market, the game becomes a 
previously unnamed game to which we refer as the game of Union (Table 3.10); the game of 

















M 1 , 1 2 , 3 
E 3 , 2 4 , 4 
 Table 3.10: Game of Union in ordinal form 
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Similar to the game of Spite, the game of Union has a unique NE in [E, E] which is also the 
Pareto-optimal outcome.  A firm that deviates to M reduces its own returns greater than that of 
its competitor (e.g., π1[M, E] < π2[M, E]) and choosing Project E leads to the highest or second 
highest return irrespective of the competitor’s action.  Figure 3.3 shows all possible games 
depending on the project investment opportunities PM (project targeting mature market) and PE 
(project targeting emerging market), as they occur in State 1. 
 
Figure 3.3: All possible CPPM games in State 1 and their Nash Equilibria in brackets depending on project 
opportunities PM and PE with bM = 1, α = 4 and β = 10 
3.2.1. MARKET PARAMETERS 
Equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) depend on the following parameters: bM, β, and α.  Thus, 
we have the following results. 





 ,  aM  and  aE  have  no 
impact on the ordinal games and merely change the absolute values of the 
returns. 
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Consequently, CPPM strategies are not dependent on the absolute value of the potential 
market returns as (s = M, E).  However, as does influence the absolute returns and may thus 
reveal the value of taking strategic action. 
Proposition 3.2: (i) Increasing both bM and PM by a factor θ leads to the same 
ordinal game for any PM and PE.  (ii) Increasing both β and PE by a factor θ 
leads to the same ordinal game for any PM and PE. 
The parameters  bM and bE alone dictate the required project investment to acquire a  certain  
percentage of the maximum market return potential.  In particular, by solving the market return 













  which is the required investment to 










 constant (i.e., keep c constant), changes to the slopes of the return curve have no 
effect on the CPPM strategy.  In effect, changes to these ratios re-scale the x- axis and y-axis of  
Figure 3.3, respectively. 
Proposition 3.3: Given any market parameter set, all previously identified 
ordinal games exist for some range of PM and PE, except for the Game of 
Chicken which can occur only if α < 8. 
Proposition 3.3 implies that if α > 8, then all games have a dominant Nash equilibrium.  
This is partly driven by the fact that a large α implies that one market has a far higher market 





3.3. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
3.3.1. CPPM STRATEGIES 
As demonstrated in Section 3.2, market dynamics can critically impact optimal project 
selection strategy.  Not only do the possible interactions with competitors affect which project 
should be chosen but they also dictate the optimal timing of the decision, the long term 
considerations and the communication strategy.  Some studies have found that the main value 
of PPM models is the helpful insight they can provide, not necessarily the final selection 
recommendation for a specific case (Loch et. al., 2001; Beaujon et al., 2001).  The important 
aspect of PPM models has also been described as colleting data and helping decision makers 
think through the decision, not mathematical optimization in isolation (Coldrick et al., 2005).  
In the same spirit, this section focuses on the general insight that can be derived from our 
CPPM model and how this should guide firms’ CPPM strategies.  Specifically, we look more 
carefully into the various games that may emerge and the insights they provide. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma: The NE predicts that firms both invest in the project that targets 
the mature market.  However, both firms could increase their returns by investing in the 
emerging market together.  The crux of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that even if the firms 
recognize this superior outcome, they both have an incentive to “cheat” and harvest the mature 
market.  The key to a better outcome is to convince the competitor to cooperate and enter the 
emerging market together.  In a one-time emerging market entry decision, this could be done 
by contractually committing to investing in the emerging market (where allowed).  If firms are 
in this situation repeatedly, the optimal strategy is the “tit-for-tat” strategy (Rapoport, 1980) in 
which firms start by cooperating, retaliate against defection and return to cooperation once the 
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other firm cooperates.  In effect, an active communication and cooperation strategy is required 
to reach a better outcome in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
The Stag Hunt: Firms are not just trying to maximize their own short-term returns but 
have a long-term perspective and may purposely try to slow the progress of their competitors.  
Although the NE (both firms investing in the emerging market) leads to the highest return for 
both firms – a seemingly stable outcome – a  firm that instead invests in the mature market still 
receives its second highest return yet leaves the other firm in the worst possible outcome 
(investing in the emerging market alone).  This might be a tempting strategy for a firm that 
takes a long-term perspective and determines that the lower immediate return is outweighed by 
the effect of impeding the progress of the competitor.  A firm may also fear that the other firm 
will take this action and thus defect to the mature market as a defensive strategy.  
Consequently, a firm seeking or fearing aggressive action in the marketplace should consider 
defecting to the mature market.  
Game of Chicken: A timely portfolio decision can significantly impact the outcome of the 
game.  As soon as the first mover has committed to investing in the mature market, the 
competitor’s best option is to invest in the emerging market.  This outcome gives the first 
mover the best possible return and the follower the second worst return.  However, this strategy 
is not without risk for the leader.  The follower can punish the leader by entering the mature 
market as well, thereby reducing the leader’s return from highest to lowest, costing the 
follower only the difference between the lowest and second lowest return.  Consequently, the 
Game of Chicken is a dangerous CPPM situation as there is a real chance that it may end with 
both firms over-investing in the mature market and receiving their lowest possible return. 
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Convergence, Spite, Union: the games of Convergence, Spite and Union all have NE 
outcomes that are likely to play out.  These games do not provide additional strategic 
opportunities or dangers that could be exploited or mitigated against. 
3.3.2. MARKET SIZES 
By estimating the market return functions and the project opportunities of the competitor, firms 
can determine the resulting CPPM game and adjust their strategy accordingly.  This subsection 
attempts to provide general guidance as to when certain games are more likely to occur.  As 
established by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, the key determinant of the type of CPPM game is the 
relative difference in market size, α.  As Figure 3.4 shows, the parameter sets that lead to 
certain CPPM games depends greatly on α; however, the areas in which certain CPPM games 
occur are unbounded within the parameter space.  To draw some conclusions, we first find the 
value of PM for which the range of PE values that lead to a particular CPPM game is 
maximized.  Subsequently, we determine the value of α that maximizes that range. 
If the factor difference in the maximum return of the two markets, α, approaches 1, the 
CPPM decision will likely require no strategic action: if the markets offer equal returns (α = 1), 
equations  (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) pass through the point  EM PP , .  Consequently, for all 
parameters, the CPPM game will be Convergence which requires no strategic considerations 
(see top left of Figure 3.4).  On the other hand, if α is very large, the CPPM decision will likely 
require no strategic action: as shown in Proposition 3.3, for α>8, the Game of Chicken does not 
exists for any parameter combination.  Furthermore, the greater α, the smaller the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma region defined by  











































although the Stag Hunt region  






















 initially stretches for 
larger α (as shown in Figure 3.4), for very large α, this area goes toward zero as well.   
  
 (a) α=1 (b) α=2 
  
 (c) α=4 (d) α=50 
 Figure 3.4: CPPM games with bM=1, β=10 
42 
Consequently, for most parameters and project opportunities, the firms will be engaged in a 
CPPM game with a clear NE that does not require strategic considerations.  The CPPM games 
that require strategic choices are most likely to occur if the difference between the maximum 
return potential of the emerging and mature market is neither very small nor very large. 
3.4. OTHER MARKET COMBINATIONS 
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we focused our analysis on the case in which firms prefer either 
building the emerging market together or harvesting the mature market without competition.  
Figure 3.2 shows the three other states.  Changes in bM, bE or β effect the games in accordance 
to Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in these states as well.  Therefore, this section focuses solely on the 
impact of the relative size of the markets, α, on the existence of games.  In State 2, firms would 
rather invest together than alone in both markets.  Consequently, all possible games in this state 
have NE outcomes in which both firms invest into the same market and there is always one 
dominant NE.  In State 3, both firms would rather be together in the mature market but alone in 
the emerging market.  In this state, the firms are playing the game of Convergence for any 
possible combination of parameters.  As described earlier, the outcome of this game is very 
predictable and cannot be influenced.  Finally, in State 4 firms want to be alone in both 
markets.  For α > 4, all parameters lead to the game of Hero (Rapoport, 1967), with the highly 
predictable outcome of both firms investing in the emerging market.  However, for α < 4, the 





M 1 , 1 3 , 4 
E 4 , 3 2 , 2 
Table 3.11: Game of Apology in ordinal form 




M 1 , 1 4 , 3 
E 3 , 4 2 , 2 
Table 3.12: The Battle of Sexes in ordinal form 
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These games are coordination games in which two NE exists, [M, E] and [E, M].  Either 
outcome results in firms getting one of their two highest possible returns; conversely, if they 
enter either market together they receive one of their two lowest possible returns.  Therefore, 
coordination and communication is critical in these games.  Furthermore, a first-mover 
advantage exists and the first firm to make a commitment can secure its highest possible return. 
3.5. NON-SYMMETRIC FIRMS 
So far we have assumed that both firms have identical project investment opportunities into the 
mature and emerging market.  While this scenario is an important special case of the more 
general CPPM problem, firms’ project investment opportunities may differ.  In this section we 
relax the symmetry assumption to gain some insights into the more general setting.  In many 
instances, firms have fixed budgets which they can allocate over a range of projects.  We 
assume that each of the two firms has a budget constraint Bn,  2,1n , which it can invest, 
completely, in either the mature or the emerging market.  As before, if the firms invest in the 
same market, their share of the market return is proportional to their share of investment.  The 














































































Table 3.13: Returns of non-symmetric firms 
Although the number of parameters remains equal to that in the symmetric setting, the 
complexity of the problem increases dramatically.  The number of possible ordinal games 
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increases from 6 in the symmetric case to 26 (!).  Furthermore, Theorem 3.1 does not hold 
anymore and for two of the new ordinal games no pure NE exists.  Similarly, Proposition 3.2 
does not hold in this setting.  Lastly, we cannot longer solve the comparisons between returns 
analytically.  Consequently, we resort to computational analysis to derive insights into the 
CPPM problem with non-symmetric firms. 
The key question we address here is how the difference in budget size between two firms 
affects their CPPM decision and profitability.  Given the total budget available to both firms to 







 .  Due to space 
considerations, we highlight the key findings of our analysis using Figure 3.5, wherein Firm 
1’s returns are plotted for varying budget constraints. Note, in this figure, for a given value of 
r, as Firm 1’s budget increases, Firm 2’s budget increases proportionally. 
Quite naturally, we find that small budgets drive both firms to joint investment in the 
mature market (which provides higher initial returns).  Since market returns are shared 
proportional to investment, when both firms jointly invest in the mature market, which occurs 
in Figure 3.5 for B1 smaller than about 1.1, an increase in r is associated with an increase in 
Firm 1’ returns. 
With a sufficient increase in budget, the high-budget firm shifts its investment from the 
joint investment into the mature market to a lone investment into the emerging market, leaving 
the small-budget firm alone in the mature market. At that point, the transition in return of the 
high-budget firm is smooth, while the small-budget firm experiences a significant increase in 
its return, as it solely harvests the mature market.  Consider for example the case of r = 0.2 
(resp., r = 0.8) in Figure 3.5.  Once B1 exceeds about 1.1 (resp., 4.4), Firm 2 (resp., Firm 1) 
enters the emerging market and leaves Firm 1 (resp., Firm 2) alone in the mature market.  At 
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this point, the profit of Firm 1 spikes up (resp., transitions upwards). So counter-intuitively, for 
intermediate range of total budget, firms could be better off competing against a competitor 
with a larger budget than against a competitor with a smaller budget—evidently, in Figure 3.5, 
when Firm 1’s budget is between about 1.1 and 3.5, the return when r = 0.2 is larger than when 
r = 0.5 or 0.8.   
On the other hand, when total budgets are relatively large, by contrast with the above 
result, we find that firms are better off competing against a competitor with a smaller budget— 
which occurs in Figure 3.5 for B1 greater than about 5.8, where an increase in r is associated 
with an increase in Firm 1’ returns. 
In the symmetric case, where r = 0.5,  the return for budgets between about 1.1 and 3.5 is 
lower than for r = 0.2 or 0.8 as both firms continue to invest in the mature market although 
they could both improve their returns by joint investment into the emerging market (the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma).  For budgets between about 3.5 and 4.5, there are two NE, both of which 
are non-symmetric such that one firm invests in the mature market and the other in the 
emerging market. The firm that secures the mature market experiences a spike in its returns 
(denoted leader in the figure).  For budgets larger than about 4.5 both firms invest into the 
emerging market. 
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Figure 3.5: Return depending on budget size of Firm 1 with α = 4, β = 8, B2 = (B1 – rB1)/r 
The other major assumption in this chapter is the focus on duopoly dynamics.  In many 
instances, there can be more than two firms competing with each other in multiple markets 
which increases the complexity of the decision substantially.  In binary investment settings, the 
resulting three-dimensional games are particularly hard to solve.  We analyze oligopoly 
settings in Chapters 5 and 6.  
3.6. CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSIONS 
Competitive forces greatly influence the optimal strategy of the general PPM problem.  We 
have demonstrated that even under simplifying assumptions the analysis of the CPPM problem 
is fairly complex.  Furthermore, we have shown that in a duopoly setting where firms have 
symmetric project investment opportunities there are a several possible interaction types that 
can occur.  Each of these situations requires different strategies and careful decision-making.  
Relaxing the symmetry assumption, and allowing for different budgets which are invested 
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solely into one of the projects, we numerically illustrated that a firm might be better off when 
the competitor’s budget increases. 
Apart from the market potential and rate of return, markets may also differ with respect to 
the certainty with which these returns can be expected.  For example, emerging markets can be 
subject to significant volatility and uncertainty.  Returns from project targeting such markets 
may be harder to estimate accurately than returns from projects targeting mature markets in 
which substantial market research has been completed.  The next chapter explores how such 
uncertainty of project returns affects the CPPM decision of firms. 
3.7. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3 
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By contradiction. If there was no pure strategy, at least one of the firms 
must have an incentive to switch actions from any possible outcome of the game.  In other 
words, starting at any of the four outcomes in Table 3.1, firms would want to switch their 
project choice in a full clockwise or counter-clockwise rotation through all the outcomes.  A 
counter-clockwise rotation would require π1[M, M] < π1[E, M], π2[E, M] < π2 [E, E], π1[E, E] < 
π1[M, E], and π2[M, E] < π2 [M, M].  Due to symmetric project choices, π1[E, M] = π2[M, E] 
and π1[M, M] = π2[M, M].  Therefore, π1[M, M] < π1[E, M] and π2[M, E] < π2[M, M] cannot 
hold simultaneously.  Similarly, the clockwise rotation π1[M, M] > π1[E, M], π2[M, E] > π2 [M, 
M], π1[E, E] > π1[M, E], and π2[E, M] > π2[E, E] cannot hold. □ 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) are all independent of aM and 
aE and solely dependent on the project opportunities PM and PE and the parameters bM, β,  
and α. □ 
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.  This holds for equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) as well.   





















.  This holds for equations 
(3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) as well. □ 
Proof of Proposition 3.3: We need to compare all equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) 
(shown in Figure 3.3): 

















































 , which defines the feasible region 
EE PP  .  Therefore, in the feasible region, (3.1) is always less than (3.2). 
























P  .  This is always true in the feasible region MM PP  . 
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 which is true for all possible 
parameters. 
(3.2) is less than (3.3) if 






































P   which is always true in the feasible 
region MM PP  .  For α > 8, PM would have to be negative for the inequality to hold, therefore  
the Game of Chicken only exists for α < 8. 


















P  . This 
always holds in the feasible region MM PP  . 
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 , which defines the feasible 
region EE PP  .  Therefore, in the feasible region, (3.3) is always less than (3.4). □ 
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4. CPPM WITH UNCERTAIN RETURNS: 
WHEN, WHERE AND HOW MUCH TO INVEST 
An additional challenge to the CPPM problem is the potential for uncertainty of project returns.  
Some markets are inherently more uncertain than others and the returns from projects targeting 
such markets can be hard to estimate.  Depending on the size of the project portfolio and the 
objective of the decision maker, the uncertainty of project returns makes the PPM problem an 
extremely challenging problem (Carraway et al., 1993).  One simple, yet effective, way of 
dealing with the complexity is to present decision makers with a number of Pareto-efficient 
outcomes, comparing expected net present value and the standard deviation of returns of 
different project bundles (Walls, 2004).  However, the degree of uncertainty of project returns 
may change as new information is gained over time.  Consequently, the decision of when to 
invest can become an important decision variable (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Furthermore, the amount of resources to be invested into a project may not be fixed.  
Although firms may have a well developed business case for each project, project budgets can 
be flexible and may be adjusted in order to best suit the situation.  Combined with the market 
choice and timing decision, this adds a third decision variable to the CPPM problem. 
Competition affects all aspects of the investment decision: firms that invest early may 
capture a first mover advantage but are subject to demand uncertainty; firms may decide to 
compete directly against their competitor in a particular market or try to avoid competition by 
deviating to other markets; finally, the size of the optimal investment can vary significantly 
depending on, for example, whether a firm can gain a monopoly position or not.  The 
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complexity of these tradeoffs, in combination with the potentially dramatic impact of such a 
key decision on a firm’s long term returns, makes this a hard and important problem.   
We continue with the setting where two firms are each considering two alternative 
investments, one targeting a mature market and one an emerging market.  However, in this 
model, demand for the emerging market is uncertain and subject to diffusion effects while the 
demand for the mature market is known with certainty and does not increase through either 
firm’s entry.  Furthermore, firms do not only decide on the timing and target market of their 
investment, but also set the optimal investment amount. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  The next section sets up our model and outlines its 
assumptions.  Section 4.2 analyzes the equilibria investment strategies and presents the key 
findings.  Section 4.3 explores the case of non-symmetric firms and Section 4.4 contains our 
conclusions. 
4.1. THE MODEL 
Assume there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, each seeking to make a capacity investment.  
In their decision making processes, two binary choices need to be made: when to invest and in 
which market to invest.  Let tn denote the investment timing of firm  2,1n , with  DItn , , 
where I and D denote early and delayed investment decisions, respectively.  Further, let sn 
denote the market choice of firm n, with  EMsn , , where M and E denote investment into 
the mature and emerging market, respectively.  Based on timing and market decisions, sixteen 
possible decision outcomes are possible.  Let [t1t2:s1s2] denote the timing and market decisions 
of the two firms.  Following the binary decisions of when and where to invest, each Firm n sets 
the size of its capacity expansion for its chosen market, kn.  Following Swinney et al. (2011), 
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we assume that firms produce at their full capacity and release all units to the market.  In 
addition, we assume that the unit cost is the same for both firms, independent of the time of 
investment, but differs for the two markets, denoted cM for the mature and cE for the emerging 
market (we briefly study the case of non-symmetric firms in Section 4.3). 
The realized price in market s, ps, is determined by the linear demand function 
  2121, kkAkkp ss  , where As, the demand intercept, is a continuous random variable with 
distribution F, with mean (μs + xs∙vs) and variance σs
2
, where xs is the number of firms investing 
in market s (early and delayed) and each firm’s market investment creates an additional 
demand νs through diffusion effects.  Since the mature market M is a well-established, highly 
predictable, market, we assume that vM = 0 and that σM
2
 = 0.  Hence, the demand intercept AM 
is known with certainty to be μM.  In contrast to the mature market, diffusion effects occur in 
the emerging market and the more firms enter the market, the stronger these effects can be 
(Krishnan et al., 2000; Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989; Shankar et al., 1999).  Furthermore, 
demand in emerging markets is difficult to predict and thus uncertain.  To simplify the 
notation, we drop the subscript E from vE and σE
2
 and write the mean and variance of the 
emerging market as v and σ
2
, respectively.  Similar to previous work, we shall require that 
021  kkAE  to guarantee a non-negative price (Gerchak, 2010).  Both firms are rational 
decision makers that aim to maximize their expected returns: 














,2121 , n .   
The sequence of decisions made by the firms is composed of three stages.  In the first stage, 
the timing game, both firms decide simultaneously whether to invest early or delay investment.  
Firms that decide to invest early into the emerging market will set their production quantity, 
i.e. the production capacity kn, before the demand uncertainty has been resolved.  By delaying 
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their investment decision, they can make their capacity decision after the actual demand has 
been observed.  Since the demand of the mature market is known with certainty, delaying 
investment into that market does not provide additional information.  In the second stage, the 
market game, firms decide which of the two projects in their project portfolio to pursue, i.e. in 
which markets to invest in capacity.  The firms that invest early make their decision before 
firms that delay investment.  In the third and final stage, the capacity game, firms set the size 
of the capacity investment.  The form of the capacity game depends on the strategic decisions 
made by the two firms in the earlier timing and market games.  If both firms decide to invest 
early or both decide to delay investment, and subsequently decide to invest in the same market, 
then they obtain Cournot returns; if one firm invests early and one delays investment, and 
subsequently both firms invest in the same market, then these firms are engaged in a 
Stackelberg game; if the firms invest in different markets, both receive monopoly returns from 
their respective markets.  The decisions made in these three stages are accompanied by 
significant resource commitments and are thus credible and irreversible.  Figure 4.1 shows the 
timeline of the sequence of decisions.  Note that there are alternative sequences of events that 
could be modeled, which would impact the nature of the strategic decisions.  For this work we 
modeled our assumptions, nomenclature and event sequence regarding the timing and capacity 






















uncertainty for the 
emerging market is 
resolved.
Firms produce 
at capacity and 
sell to the 
market.
time
Capacity GameMarket GameTiming Game
 
Figure 4.1: Timeline of decisions (non-decision events are in italic) 
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Figure 4.2 shows the firms’ decisions (corresponding to Figure 4.1) in extensive form.  
 
Figure 4.2: Firms’ investment decisions in extensive form 
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[II:MM]  Cournot 
[II:ME]  Monopoly 
[II:EM]  Monopoly 
[II:EE]  Cournot 
[ID:MM]  Stackelberg 
[ID:ME]  Monopoly 
[ID:EM]  Monopoly 
[ID:EE]  Stackelberg 
[DI:MM]  Stackelberg 
[DI:EM]  Monopoly 
[DI:ME]  Monopoly 
[DI:EE]  Stackelberg 
[DD:MM]  Cournot 
[DD:ME]  Monopoly 
[DD:EM]  Monopoly 
[DD:EE]  Cournot 
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4.2. MODEL ANALYSIS 
To find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) strategies, we solve the model 
backwards.  We first find the equilibria capacity expansions, kn
*
, for each of the sixteen 
possible outcomes of the timing and market games.  The equilibria capacity expansion size for 
each firm depends on its own timing and market decisions as well as the decisions of its 
counterpart.  In addition to these competitive aspects, the uncertainty of demand in the 
emerging market influences the size of the capacity expansion.  The following lemma lists all 
possible outcomes and corresponding capacity decisions and returns.  To simplify the 
expressions, we denote sss c  , s . 
Lemma 4.1: Consider the capacity games.  The equilibrium capacities and 























































































































































































MMMID   
# 
Given that firms have symmetric costs, these equilibria also hold if the strategies of Firm 1 and Firm 2 
are reversed. That is, each such outcome represents two outcomes.
 
Table 4.1: Capacity game equilibria 
All proofs appear in Section 4.5. 
Using the equilibria strategies of the capacity games from Lemma 4.1, we next find the 
equilibria strategies of the market game contingent on the outcome of the timing game.  For 
example, if the outcome of the timing game was that both firms invest early, then there are four 
possible market game outcomes: both firms invest into the mature market, both firms invest 
into the emerging market, or Firm 1 invests into the mature and Firm 2 invests into the 
emerging market (and vice versa).  If both firms invest at the same time, then the resulting 
market game is a simultaneous move game; if one firm invests early and one late, we analyze 
the corresponding sequential game. 
Using the expected returns of the established SPNE of the market games for all four 
possible timing game outcomes, we can analyze the equilibria of the timing game itself.  The 
timing decision is always made simultaneously by the two firms.  The following two 
propositions characterize all possible equilibria strategies, which could either be unique 
(Proposition 4.1) or give rise to multiple equilibria strategies (Proposition 4.2).  We first 
characterize the parameter settings that yield a unique SPNE equilibrium. 
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Proposition 4.1: There are three distinct regions in the parameter space that have 
a unique SPNE.  Specifically, the unique SPNE are: 









2. [II:EE] if 



















































3 EM ; 



































E  or  

























All of the outcomes listed in Proposition 4.1 are symmetric with respect to both the timing 
and market decisions.  The symmetric outcome [DD:MM] is not an equilibrium strategy since 
the demand in the mature market is known with certainty and firms are thus not exposed to 
demand variance in this market; therefore, they have no incentive to delay investment.  
Moreover, investing early gains them a leadership position in the market.  Thus, [DD:MM] is 
not an equilibrium strategy because firms have an incentive to change their strategy and invest 
early.  We now characterize the remaining regions where multiple equilibria exist. 
Proposition 4.2: There are three regions in the parameter space that have multiple 
SPNE.  Specifically, the SPNE are: 
1. [ID:ME] or [DI:EM] if 
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  . 
As is evident from Proposition 4.2, the outcome pairs [ID:MM] or [DI:MM], [ID:EM] or 
[DI:ME] and [ID:EE] or [DI:EE] are not equilibria strategies.  In the case of the first outcome 
pair, [ID:MM] or [DI:MM], the firm that delays investment into the mature market becomes the 
Stackelberg follower.  Since delaying investment does not provide additional information 
about the demand for the mature market, firms can improve their position by investing early 
into the mature market, in which case they are engaged in a Cournot competition.  Similarly, 
for the pair of outcomes [ID:EM] and [DI:ME], the firm that delays its investment can secure at 
least the same return by investing early into the mature market, i.e., [II:EM] or [II:ME].  
Finally, the pair of outcomes [ID:EE] and [DI:EE] imply that one firm invests early in spite of 
the demand uncertainty in the emerging market.  In this case, the other firm is driven to follow 
suit to avoid being the Stackelberg follower, leading to the outcome [II:EE].  The details of 
these statements are in the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. 
The equilibria regions from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 are illustrated in Figure 4.3 for a 
number of possible parameter instances.  The x-axis depicts v, the diffusion rate of the 
emerging market, and the y-axis depicts σ
2
, the variance of demand in the emerging market.  
These parameters define the key differences between the mature and the emerging market: the 
benefit of competitive entry into the emerging market is increasing in v, and the benefit of 
delaying investment into the emerging market is increasing in σ
2
.  In Figure 4.3, the unit cost 
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be the same in both markets, cM = cE = 0.5, and the demand in the emerging market, μE, is 1.  
The four sub-figures demonstrate the impact as μM is varied from 0.8 to 1.6.  Figure 4.3 also 
reveals how v and σ
2
 affect the strategy of the two firms in terms of timing and market choices.  
The thick solid lines depict the separation between unique and multiple equilibria regions, as 
defined by Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 
  
 (a) μM = 1.6  (b) μM = 1.35 
  
 (c) μM = 1 (d) μM = 0.8 
Figure 4.3: Optimal investment strategies of market and timing game for μE = 1 and cM = cE = 0.5. 























































































v, diffusion effect of firms in emerging market
v, diffusion effect of firms in emerging marketv, diffusion effect of firms in emerging market


































































According to Figure 4.3, some of the regions defined in Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 are 
eliminated for certain parameter values.  For example, as the expected demand intercept of the 
mature market, μM, decreases in relation to that of the emerging market, μE, the region where at 
least one of the firms invests into the mature market shrinks (Figures 4.3a – 4.3c) and is 
eventually eliminated (Figure 4.3d).   
Figure 4.3b depicts an instance where all seven regions defined in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 
are possible.  As the following discussion demonstrates, the shape of these equilibria regions 
can be counter-intuitive.  An increase in demand uncertainty is typically associated with an 
increase in the value of delaying investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  Consequently, if firms 
invest early into the emerging market, then we expect that a sufficient increase in the demand 
uncertainty, σ
2
, will induce firms to switch to delaying their investment into this market.  Since 
the returns from delayed investment into the emerging market are increasing in σ
2
 (as shown in 
Lemma 4.1), we also expect an increase in σ
2
 to drive firms to shift from the mature market 
into the emerging market.  As Figure 4.3 illustrates, this is generally true in our model; but, 
surprisingly, we find that this does not hold true universally.  For example, one can observe 
from Figure 4.3a (4.3b, respectively) that if v = 0.75 (0.55, respectively) and σ
2
 increases from 
0.1 to 0.3, then the equilibrium strategy changes from [DD:EE] to [II:EE].  Despite an increase 
in demand uncertainty, firms switch from delayed investment to investing early!  If σ
2
 = 0.1, 
then a firm that invests early into the emerging market causes the other firm to invest into the 
mature market instead, thereby not only adding exposure to demand uncertainty but also 
foregoing the diffusion effects of the other firm.  Therefore, both firms prefer to delay 
investment into the emerging market.  By contrast, if σ
2
 = 0.3, then demand uncertainty is 
sufficiently high so that a firm that invests early into the emerging market can rely on the other 
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firm pursuing delayed investment into the emerging market (thus adding its demand diffusion).  
Consequently, in this instance, firms switch from delayed to early investment as demand 
uncertainty increases. 
As mentioned above, an increase in the diffusion effect, v, enhances the attractiveness of 
the emerging market and, as a result, we expect firms to shift their investment from the mature 
market to the emerging market.  Indeed, we observe this pattern in Figure 4.3.  However, an 
increase in v has a non-trivial effect on the timing of the investment decision.  Generally, if σ
2
 
is large, we anticipate firms to delay their investment decision and if σ
2
 is small, firms will 
invest early to secure the Stackelberg leader position.  However, Figures 4.3a and 4.3b reveal 
that when σ
2
 is small, firms modify their investment timing decisions as v increases.  Consider 
in Figure 4.3b the case where σ
2
 = 0.01 and either v < 0.06 or v > 0.59: firms invest early, as 
expected.  However, for intermediate values of v, the optimal strategy of the timing game 
transitions to one firm investing early and one late (0.06 < v < 0.34), to both delaying 
investment (0.34 < v < 0.35), to both investing early (0.35 < v < 0.49), to both investing late 
(0.49 < v < 0.59).  The existence of multiple viable projects (i.e., markets) in the portfolio is 
key to this complexity: if one market is far superior to the other, the pattern of optimal 
investment strategies becomes more predictable.  Namely, as μM decreases, the timing 
complexity resolves, and, as exhibited in Figures 4.3c and 4.3d, we only have transitions from 
both delaying investment to both investing early.  In summary, the decision of investing early 
and gaining a leadership position versus delaying investment to eliminate demand uncertainty 
is clearly dependent on the market parameters and can vary in unpredictable ways.  While 
some of the tradeoffs are understood (Craig, 1995), the debate on optimal strategy continues in 
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the literature.  Figure 4.3 supports the view that there is no universal optimal strategy and that 
the specific market situation should guide optimal timing decisions. 
The existence of multiple investment opportunities in the portfolio also critically impacts 
the degree of uncertainty required for firms to delay investment into the emerging market.  For 
example, for 0.5 < v < 0.6 in Figure 4.3b, firms choose to delay investment even if σ
2
 = 0.  This 
result is driven by the fact that a firm that invests early into the emerging market—thereby 
claiming leadership—cannot rely on the other firm investing into the same market and adding 
its demand diffusion.  Instead, the other firm has the option of achieving monopolistic returns 
in the mature market.  If the diffusion effect of competitive entry into the emerging market is 
sufficiently high, the prospect of reduced demand (by the other firm deviating to the mature 
market) may be sufficient to prevent firms from pursuing the leader position in the emerging 
market through early investment.  This leads to the outcome in which both firms delay 
investment into the emerging market in order to eliminate demand uncertainty and to take 
advantage of the diffusion effects.  However, in the presence of high diffusion effects, firms 
may invest early into the emerging market even under relatively high demand uncertainty (for 
example at σ
2
 = 0.2 and v = 0.7 in Figure 4.3b).  We have the following theorem. 
Theorem  4.1:  If 












 EEM , then  firms are trapped in  
a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation where both firms invest early into the emerging 
market instead of the Pareto-optimal outcome of both pursuing delayed 
investment into the emerging market. 
In the parameter region defined by Theorem 4.1 (which is the region labeled [II:EE] at the 
bottom right of Figures 4.3a and 4.3b and parts of that region in Figures 4.3c and 4.3d), the 
diffusion effect is large enough for both firms to prefer to be a follower in the emerging market 
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over being a monopolist in the mature market.  At the same time, the demand uncertainty is not 
high enough to warrant delayed investment into the emerging market.  Even though both firms 
would receive higher returns by delayed investment, the additional return from being the 
Stackelberg leader (or the fear of only receiving follower returns) drives both firms to instead 
invest early into the emerging market.  This dynamic is well documented in the literature: 
Lilien and Yoon (1990) empirically show that if markets are in the introductory or growth 
phase—i.e., diffusion effects are high—early entrants perform better than later entrants.  Smit 
and Trigeorgis (2004) demonstrate how uncertainty in the market, and the advantage a leader 
might acquire, leads to outcomes where firms sacrifice substantial returns by investing 
prematurely.  Emerging markets are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic as the early 
investor can build a dominant position through, for example, patents or distribution channels.  
The risk of being left behind, and potentially even blocked out of a market, drives firms to 
invest early even if demand uncertainty is quite substantial.  An example of this market 
dynamic was the race to develop superior memory chips between a collaboration of Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi Electric and Texas Instruments and a collaboration of NEC, Lucent Technologies 
and Samsung.  Both partnerships could have received higher returns if they had tempered the 
pace of investment; however, the stakes were too high and both partnerships invested 
significant resources at a very early stage of the technology (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004).  
The following theorem defines a region which is characterized by asymmetric market 
choices. 
















M , the SPNE are such 
that the two firms invest in different markets. 
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In the parameter region defined by Theorem 4.2, each firm prefers a monopoly position in 
the emerging market over Cournot investment into the mature market, and also prefers to be 
the monopolist in the mature market over delayed Cournot investment into the emerging 
market.  The dynamics in this region are classified as coordination games (Cooper, 1999).  In 
equilibrium, each firm pursues a different market but it is not clear which of the two equilibria 
strategies is pursued.  An example of firms that have successfully pursued asymmetric 
investment strategies are the Coca Cola Company and PepsiCo.  As described in the 
introduction, when in the late 1990s PepsiCo began pursuing a strategy of entering different 
markets than the Coca Cola Company, its international revenue and returns rose dramatically 
(Yoffie, 2004). 
These asymmetric equilibria also result in asymmetric returns to the firms.  Next, we 
discuss bounds on the difference of returns between the two firms.  In particular, we can prove 
that one of the firms may receive up to 2.25 times greater returns than its competitor.  
Consequently, it may be justified to employ significant resources to secure the more desirable 
investment strategy equilibrium.  In such a market dynamic, reliable competitive intelligence 
and an effective communication strategy are key in achieving a good outcome. 
The key measure in defining the equilibria regions of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 is the 
difference between the average demand and unit cost in the mature market, ΔM, and the 
difference between the average demand and unit cost in the emerging market, ΔE.  The 
following theorem states the role of the ratio of these two measures. 







M , then the firms never invest into the mature market 







M , then the firms always invest into the emerging market 
together.   
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Although a detailed analysis is required to reveal the optimal investment strategy for any 
particular situation, the ratio EM  can quickly reduce the complexity of the problem.  The 
ratio provides quick direction without requiring decision-makers to first determine the degree 
of demand uncertainty and diffusion effects present in the emerging market.  In particular, if 
this ratio is less than 3/2, both firms investing into the mature market is never an optimal 
strategy and the mature market should only be considered if a firm thinks that it can secure the 
monopoly position in that market.  Furthermore, if this ratio is less than 2/3, firms know that 
even sole investment into the mature market is never an optimal strategy.  Consequently, firms 
can shift their attention and resources fully onto the emerging market and the timing of their 
investment decision. 
4.3. NON-SYMMETRIC FIRMS 
In this section, we turn to a more general case where firms are not symmetric in terms of cost 
and diffusion effects.  Let cs,n denote the unit cost of firm n for the product targeting market s, 
and let νn denote firm n’s diffusion effect in the emerging market.  With these assumptions, the 
number of model parameters increases from five to nine and the model becomes too complex 
for a closed form solution.  We present two numerical instances that represent a broad range of 
scenarios to highlight some of the dynamics that can occur in the non-symmetric setting.  In the 
first instance, we consider competition between a negligent and an attentive firm (as defined 
below), and in the second example, a multinational firm and a local firm compete.   
4.3.1. STRATEGIC NEGLIGENCE 
In this example, we analyze a negligent firm that allows its costs in the mature market to rise in 
comparison to its attentive competitor.  Unit costs may rise due to internal factors, such as 
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insufficient investment in continuous employee training and maintenance of equipment, or due 
to external factors, such as an increase in the price of raw resources required in production.  
For this example, we let cM,1 = 1.2∙cM,2, cE,1 = cE,2 and v1 = v2 = v.  Figure 4.4 depicts the 
ranking of returns for the two firms depending on the uncertainty and diffusion effects of the 
emerging market. 






























Figure 4.4: Negligent vs. Attentive Firm, with μM=1.35, μE=1, cM,2=cE,2=cE,1=0.5, cM,1=0.6 
In the region denoted “NF” in Figure 4.4, higher unit costs in the mature market lead to an 
advantage for the negligent firm since it can commit to investment into the emerging market 
irrespective of the decision of the attentive firm.  In this region, the attentive firm yields and 
invests into the less attractive mature market.  This dynamic only changes if the emerging 
market is adequately attractive (high σ
2
 and v), such that even the attentive firm prefers 
Cournot investment into the emerging market over sole investment into the mature market, or 
if the emerging market is sufficiently unattractive such that even the negligent firm invests into 
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due to multiple equilibria 
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the mature market.  Consequently, increasing unit costs in a mature market (either through 
negligence or intentionally) can be a profitable strategy for certain market parameters. 
4.3.2. MULTINATIONAL VS. LOCAL FIRM 
Multinationals typically have significant cost advantages due to economies of scale and their 
experiences in other markets; meanwhile, local firms can be very successful in increasing the 
demand in their home markets due to their local knowledge and relationships with other key 
stakeholders such as suppliers (Craig, 1995).  While demand in the mature market cannot be 
increased by either firm, we assume that the local firm has ability to increase demand in the 
emerging market to a much greater degree than the multinational.  In line with the existing 
literature, we assume that cs,1 = 0.8∙cs,2 s  and ν2 = 3ν1, where Firm 1 is the multinational and 
Firm 2 is the local firm.  Figure 4.5 depicts the return ranking depending on the uncertainty and 
diffusion effects in the emerging market. 































Figure 4.5: Multinational vs. Local Firm, with μM=1.35, μE=1, cM,2=cE,2=0.5, cM,1=cE,1=0.4, ν2=3ν1 
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As Figure 4.5 reveals, the multinational firm generally receives higher returns if both σ
2
 
and vn are either high or low.  In these regions, the investment decisions of the two firms are 
symmetric, and the multinational receives higher returns due to its cost advantage.  However, 
we do find a region where the local firm has greater returns.  This occurs when demand 
uncertainty is sufficiently low and diffusion effects are at some intermediate level.  In the 
region labeled “LF”, the local firm commits to investing into the emerging market and pushes 
the multinational into the mature market.  This occurs because the local firm can build the 
emerging market to be more profitable than the multinational can, due to its superior diffusion 
effect.  However, if the emerging market becomes too attractive (very high uncertainty and/or 
high diffusion effect), then the multinational joins into the emerging market, using its lower 
costs to receive higher returns. 
4.4. CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter, we developed a model that combines the problem of deciding when, where and 
how much to invest while considering competition.  With this comprehensive model, we are 
able to extend and modify previous findings.  In particular, while the real options literature 
suggests that firms only delay investment if there is significant uncertainty in the market 
demand (see, for example, Kulatilaka and Periotti, 1998; Swinney et al., 2011), our analysis 
shows that firms may decide to delay investment even if there is little uncertainty in the 
market.  In a single market setting, firms are tempted to invest early to gain a leader position 
and avoid being the follower; however, the existence of two investment alternatives in the 
portfolio provides firms with the flexibility to wait until demand uncertainty has been resolved, 
even if this uncertainty is not high. 
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Our analysis also provides support for the view that by focusing on internal 
considerations—and mostly ignoring competition—the PPM literature is missing an important 
aspect of the investment decision (Bower and Gilbert, 2005; Hauser et al., 2006).  In particular, 
if diffusion effects are high, firms may invest early into the emerging market even if demand 
uncertainty is relatively high.  Although delaying investment would lead to higher returns for 
both firms, both firms want to achieve even higher returns by becoming the leader in the 
market.  Asymmetric investment is important in instances where there are multiple equilibria 
strategies and both firms seek to invest as a monopoly in either market.  If the coordination of 
investments fails, a poor outcome for both firms can ensue.  This challenge is exacerbated by 
the fact that one market is typically more attractive than the other and thus both firms prefer to 
be the monopolist in the more attractive market. 
We also derived a straightforward ratio which can help decision makers focus their 
resources early into one market.  In particular, if the ratio EM   is less than 2/3, then firms 
never invest into the mature market and can focus on the emerging market.  Since significant 
resources can be spent contemplating decisions and acquiring the necessary information to 
make an informed decision, a method of accelerating the decision process can lead to 
significant cost savings. 
Although this model constrains the number of projects (i.e., markets) that firms can invest 
in, firms are not constrained with respect to the amount of resources they can invest into their 
chosen market.  However, in many circumstances, firms have a limited R&D budget with 
which to invest in new projects.  This shifts the problem from a binary investment decision of 
which project to pursue to a continuous investment decision of how to allocate a limited budget 
over multiple projects.  Furthermore, we have again focused on duopoly settings in this 
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chapter.  Expanding this model to oligopoly settings may reveal additional challenges as 
coordination and cooperation between firms become harder to achieve.  In the next chapter, we 
address the continuous resource allocation problem and analyze duopoly as well as oligopoly 
settings. 
4.5. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4 
Proof of Lemma 4.1: We prove the optimal capacity decision for each outcome separately. 








, is concave in 














 EEEIIn , n . 














max , is concave in kE,n, 











 , which are the Cournot 
outputs and depend on the realized demand in the emerging market. Therefore, 




















E , n . 
[II:MM] or [DD:MM]: Similar to the proofs for [II:EE] and [DD:EE], except that σ
2 
= 0 and 


















[II:EM] or [ID:EM] and [DI:EM] or [DD:EM]: Similar to previous proofs of the other  
outcomes, only that firms are monopolies in their respective markets.  Therefore, the optimal 
capacity investment for the firm investing into the mature market is 
2
M , for the firm 
investing early into the emerging market is 
2
vE  , and for the firm pursuing delayed 
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investment into the emerging market is 
2






























[ID:EE] and [ID:MM]:  Similar to the previous proofs, but the firm that invests early 
receives Stackelberg-leader returns and the firm that delays investment receives Stackelberg-
follower returns.   
Therefore, the optimal capacity investments for the leader are 
2
M  and 
2
2vE  , for the 
mature and emerging market respectively.  Similarly, the optimal capacity investments for the 
follower are 
4
M  and 
4


























MMMID  . □ 
Preliminaries for the Proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2: We establish the following 
Lemmas which are required for the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.  For the remainder of 
the proofs, we state the condition in terms of the model variables ( ,s σ, v), followed by the 
equivalence expressed in terms of the return statements, 2121
: sstt
n , in square brackets using 
Lemma 4.1. 
Lemma 4.A1:  222
9
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Proof: The Lemma always hold if 






  EMEM  . (4.P1) 
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We can reduce the LHS of (4.P1) by increasing v, but given  222
9
4
  EM  and the 
condition 02  , we have EMv 
3
2
.  For the largest feasible v, EMv 
3
2



















 EMM  , which holds for all 0E . □ 
The following Lemmas 4.A2 and 4.A3 compare returns in potential timing game outcomes 
for firms investing into the mature and the emerging market, respectively. 
Lemma 4.A2: Returns from the mature market have the following properties for all 































Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 4.1. □ 
Lemma 4.A3: Returns from the emerging market have the following properties for all 







































Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 4.1. □ 


















, [tt:EE] is as Nash 





[tt:MM] is dominated by [tt:EE], t . □ 















 and due to symmetry, [DD:ss] is a Nash equilibrium while [ID:ss] 




, [II:ss] is dominated by  
[DD:ss], s . □ 


























































































, the Lemma holds. □ 
Proof of Proposition 4.1: For each of the regions, we solve the game backward, recalling the 
optimal capacity decisions from Lemma 4.1.  First, we prove the equilibria strategies of the 
market game for each of the four possible outcomes of the timing game [t1t2] and then we 
prove the equilibrium strategy for the timing game itself.  We assume that firms do not pursue 
weakly dominated strategies and that if there are two Nash equilibria where one provides 
higher returns for both firms, then firms pursue the Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium.  Since 
the firms are symmetric with respect to their production costs, we immediately extend any 
conclusion that is made from Firm 1’s perspective to Firm 2, and equilibria strategies for the 
timing game outcome [DI] are equivalent to the strategies of [ID]. 
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Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 





The condition  222
9
4












] by Lemma 4.A1. 
Consequently, if both firms delay investment, Firm 1 prefers investing 
in the mature market regardless of Firm 2’s market decision. 
[MM] 
[II] 
The condition  222
9
4













 by Lemmas 4.A2.i and 4.A3.ii.  
The additionally established condition  222 2
4
9














Lemmas 4.A2.ii and 4.A3.i.  Consequently, if both firms invest early, 





  = π1
II:MM
 , delaying investment is a dominated strategy because if Firm 1 
delays but Firm 2 invests early, Firm 1 receives lower returns than in the [II:MM] outcome 













).  Consequently, the unique strategy 








M  is [II:MM]. 
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Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 


























































 by Lemmas 4.A3.ii, 4.A3.i, and 4.A2.iv.  
Consequently, if both firms delay investment, Firm 1 prefers to invest 
in the emerging market regardless of Firm 2’s market decision. 
[EE] 
[II] 


























 by Lemmas 4.A2.ii, 4.A3.i, and 4.A2.iv.  Therefore, if both 
firms invest early, Firm 1 prefers to invest in the emerging market 
regardless of Firm 2’s market decision. 
[EE] 
[ID] 



















 by Lemmas 4.A3.i and 




















] holds, then  
[EM] 
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Firm 1 knows that Firm 2 invests into the mature market if Firm 1 
invests into the emerging market early.  Since we have established that 
Firm 1 prefers this outcome to either possible outcome if Firm 1 invests 









the SPNE of this timing game outcome is [EM]. 














 (by  
Lemma 4.A2.ii), Firm 1 prefers to invest early regardless of Firm 2’s timing choice, and 
































  is [II:EE]. 
Next, we prove that if 












 EEM , the equilibrium strategy is 




Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 




















































.  Since, by Lemma 




, Lemma 4.A4 implies that 

























 (by Lemmas 














































], [ID:EE] is the unique 
SPNE.  
[EE] 








, Firm 1 prefers to invest 
early regardless of Firm 2’s timing decision, and thus the equilibrium strategy when 












 EEM  is [II:EE]. 







































M  or 
 





























Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 






















 (by Lemma 4.A2.iv), Lemma 4.A4 implies 
that Firm 1 always invests into the emerging market. 
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 (by Lemma 4.A3.i).  Consequently, 
the outcome [DD:EE] yields returns greater than any possible market game outcome of the 
timing game [II]. 
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] implies that [ID:EE] is not attainable because Firm 2 will switch to 
[ID:EM].  Therefore, Firm 1 prefers [DD:EE] over any possible market game outcome of the 







































 EM  or 
 





























Proof of Proposition 4.2: 
Region 1: We prove that if 
























M , the equilibria strategies 




Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 































], then [DD:EM] is a 

























 by Lemmas 4.A2.ii and 4.A3.i.  
Therefore, [II:EE] is not a Nash equilibrium.  This leaves [II:ME], 





One can immediately observe that the condition 
























 (by Lemmas 









Lemmas 4.A2.ii and 4.A2.iv); therefore, [ID:ME] is a unique SPNE. 
[ME] 
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Given the number of potential market games defined for each possible timing game, there 
are six potential outcome combinations that we need to analyze (two outcomes from [DD] ∙ 
three outcomes from [II]  ∙ a single outcome from [ID]). 


















 (by Lemma 4.A2.ii); therefore, delaying is a weakly dominated strategy 





 (by Lemma 4.A3.iii), the equilibrium outcome is [ID:ME].  By the same logic, 
if the outcomes are [DD:EM] and [II:EM], the equilibrium outcome is [DI:EM]. 




















 (by Lemma 4.A2.ii); therefore, delaying is a strictly dominated strategy for 
Firm 1 and since we have π2
ID:ME
  > π2
II:ME
 (by Lemma 4.A3.iii), the equilibrium outcome is 
[ID:ME].  By the same logic, if the outcomes are [DD:ME] and [II:EM], the equilibrium 
outcome is [DI:EM]. 


















 (by Lemma 4.A2.ii); therefore, investing early is a weakly dominated 











 (by Lemma 4.A2.ii), the equilibrium outcome is [DI:EM].  By the same logic, if the 
outcomes are [DD:EM] and [II:MM], the equilibrium outcome is [ID:ME]. 
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M  are [ID:ME] and [DI:EM]. 



































 EM , the equilibria strategies 




Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 



















implies that  [DD:EE] is not a Nash equilibrium.  Similarly, the 











 (by Lemma 4.A2.iv); therefore, 

















 (by Lemmas 4.A2.ii and 4.A3.i), and thus [II:EE] is 














and   222   EM  and EM  : 
[ME] 
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 by Lemmas 4.A3.ix and 4.A2.v.   





















































also implies a SPNE at [ID:ME]. 















 EM  and EM  : 
























] can only 








].  Additionally,  













 by Lemmas 4.A3.iii and 4.A2.v.   
Therefore [ID:ME] is the SPNE. 



























 (by Lemma 4.A2.ii), [DD:ME] and [DD:EM] are equilibria 



























 (by Lemmas 





























222  EM  and 


















 EM . 







































Proof of respective market game equilibria strategy 



















 by Lemmas 4.A3.ii and 4.A2.iv; 

































by Lemma 4.A2.ii; therefore, [II:EM] is a Nash equilibrium. Due to 






























], the SPNE is 
[ID:EM]. 
[EM] 
Regardless of the market game outcome under [DD], one of the firms has an incentive to 

































].  From the outcome [ID:EM], Firm 2 has 


















Lemma 4.A2.iii). Only from the outcomes [II:EM] and [II:ME] neither of the firms has an  



































  . □ 
Proof of Theorem 4.1: When 












 EEM , then for any timing  
decision by the two firms, both invest into the emerging market (by the proof of Region 2 of 
Proposition 4.1).  Consequently, we focus only on the timing decision and prove that it has the 




































Table 4.2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma in ordinal form 




























.  Given symmetric firms, this fully characterizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
where the equilibrium strategy is [II:EE], but this outcome is Pareto-inferior to [DD:EE]. □ 
















M  defines a  
region that is a subset of Regions 1-3 of Proposition 4.2.  For EM  , this region is 
comprised of Regions 1 and 2 of Proposition 4.2.  For EM  , this region is a subset of 
Regions 2 and 3 of Proposition 4.2.  Therefore, there are always two SPNE in this region.   □ 



















ME  .  Intuitively, the Cournot returns from the 
mature market must exceed the highest possible return from monopoly investment into the 
emerging market, which is achieved by delayed investment into the emerging market.  The  
LHS of the expression in brackets can be minimized by setting σ
2
 and ν to zero.  The equation 







M .  This implies that even if the uncertainty and diffusion effects of 





must be greater than 3/2 for both firms to invest in  
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the mature market.  Conversely, if this ratio is less than 3/2, firms will not both invest in the 
mature market for any market parameters. (ii) All regions where the outcome of the market  
game is not [EE] (defined by Proposition 4.2 and Region 1 in Proposition 4.1) are constrained 
by MEIIEEII :1
:









2 ME v .  Intuitively, the monopoly return is the best possible  
return from the mature market and by investing early into the emerging market a firm can  
guarantee at least Cournot returns.  Without the condition MEIIEEII :1
:
1   , firms have no 







M , then 
23
2 ME v 








M  , then 
both firms invest into the emerging market. □ 
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5. CPPM: CONTINUOUS INVESTMENT 
DECISIONS 
In some instances, firms have a well developed business case for each project opportunity and 
require a fixed amount of resources to execute a particular project (see Chapter 3).  In other 
instances, the optimal investment into a particular project, or market, is based on the available 
market parameters (see Chapter 4).  In both cases, we have assumed that firms face binary 
investment decision of which projects to fund and are constrained by the number of projects 
that they can invest in.  Namely, firms choose between investing fully into either the emerging 
market or the mature market. 
However, in many situations, firms’ project investments can be scaled according to the 
amount of resources a firm is willing or able to invest (Loch and Kavadias, 2010).  Under this 
framework, firms do not just decide whether to fund a project, but how much to invest into 
each project, subject to their budget constraint.  The model in this chapter still assumes two 
firms with projects that target a mature and an emerging market, but firms decide how to 
distribute their budget over the two markets in a continuous manner. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, we establish the benchmark case 
by discussing the optimal budget allocation of a monopoly.  In Section 5.2 we develop the 
competitive PPM model that considers the budget allocation problem faced by duopoly firms.  
We are then able to derive insights regarding the effect of competition.  Section 5.3 analyzes 
the oligopoly setting and Section 5.4 contains conclusions for this chapter. 
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5.1. THE MONOPOLY BENCHMARK  
Consider a monopoly faced with two project investment opportunities: one targeting a mature 
market and another targeting an emerging market.  Endowed with an investment budget of BM, 
all of which is to be invested, the monopoly needs to decide what share  1,0Mr of its budget 
to allocate to the project targeting the mature market, where the remaining 1 – rM of the budget 
is invested in the project targeting the emerging market.  Assuming that project investments 
can be scaled according to the available budget, our focus is on how a monopoly allocates a 
given budget between the two projects.  
The mature and emerging markets offer returns for an investment amount x according to 
functions   axxf   and   ,bxxg  respectively, where  1,0,  .  Thus, the market return 
functions follow the Inada conditions (Inada, 1963): (i) zero investment into a market results in 
zero returns from that market,     00,0 gf ; (ii) increasing investment into a market always 
results in higher total returns, 0',' gf ; (iii) the marginal returns are decreasing, 0'','' gf ; 
and (iv) the functions are continuously differentiable and the limit of the derivative towards 
zero is positive infinity and the limit towards positive infinity is zero.   
The parameters a and b define the market potential of the mature and emerging markets, 
respectively: the greater the market potential, the greater the returns from that market at any 
investment level.  We characterize the emerging market as the market with the greater market 
potential, b > a, however, the emerging market is also more risky than the well-understood 
mature market.  To capture this uncertainty, we let p,  1,0p , denote the probability that the 
emerging market has the expected return function g(∙) and assume that with probability 1– p 
the emerging market provides no returns. 
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The parameters α and β, represent the degree of homogeneity of the mature and emerging 
markets’ return functions, respectively.  In the context of this resource allocation problem, we 
use these parameters to define the marginal productivity of R&D investment of the respective 
markets.  A low marginal productivity (i.e., a low value of α or β) implies that the market 
provides significant returns for small investments but then experiences diminishing returns 
quickly.  By contrast, markets with high marginal productivity may initially provide lower 
returns but continue to provide significant returns for large investments.  We assume that the 
emerging market has a higher marginal productivity than the mature market, α < β, since the 
mature market provides less opportunities for significant product or service improvements or 
new product developments.   
As depicted in Figure 5.1 (for α = 0.1, β = 0.5, a = 1, b = 2, p = 0.6), these assumptions 
generally imply that the mature market provides larger returns than the emerging market for 
small investments.  For example, a small product change to an existing product may provide 
some quick returns in a mature market in which the firm has already established a customer 
base, whereas this product change would not see large returns in an emerging market without 
significant investment into marketing of the new product.  By contrast, significant investment 
into a radically new product may lead to disappointing returns in a mature market, whereas 
such a new product may help develop the emerging market and lead to very high returns.  
Although a large investment into the emerging market can lead to the highest possible return 
for a firm, investment into an emerging market is not without risk.  Note that we are not 
attempting to fully capture the characteristics of a mature versus an emerging market but are 
using this terminology to facilitate the discussion.  
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Figure 5.1: Market returns of mature and emerging markets; 
α = 0.1, β = 0.5, a = 1, b = 2, p = 0.6 
The risk neutral monopoly aims to maximize its total expected return 
       MMMMM BrpbBraE  1 .  Under the Inada conditions, the optimal budget 
allocation occurs when the marginal returns from all markets coincide (Loch and Kavadias, 
2002).  Specifically, the optimal allocation, rM
*
, is the value of rM that solves the following first 
order condition for the monopoly’s expected return,  ME  : 
      11 1     MMMM BrbpBra . (5.1) 
Since the second order condition of the monopoly’s expected return, 
           ,111'' 22     MMMMM BrbpBraE is less than zero for  1,0,  , 
the value of rM that solves (5.1) leads to the highest expected return for the monopoly.  Clearly, 
the optimal budget allocation depends on the particular market parameters of f(∙) and g(∙).  
However, it is not obvious how the size of the budget influences the share of the budget being 
invested into the respective markets.  We have the following result. 
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Proposition 5.1: If the monopoly budget changes from MB  to ,MM BB   
 then the optimal budget allocation changes from 
*
Mr  to  
**
MM rr   (and 
vice versa). 
All proofs are provided in Section 5.5.  
Proposition 5.1 states that if the monopoly increases (decreases) its budget, it allocates a 
greater (smaller) share of its budget to the project targeting the emerging market.  Indeed, 
larger investment funds make the emerging market more lucrative compared to the mature 
market in which large investments experience diminishing returns.  However, increasing 
investment into the emerging market also increases risk exposure since the returns from the 
emerging market are uncertain.  The following proposition characterizes how the market 
parameters affect the budget allocation decision. 












monopoly’s optimal budget allocation rM
*








 (>, <), then 
2
1* Mr   (>, <, respectively). 
Proposition 5.2 implies that the market potential parameters a and b make the respective 
markets more attractive independent of the other market characteristics and the available 
investment budget.  Similarly, the greater the probability that the emerging market will reach 
its market potential, the more attractive this market becomes.  We discuss the effect of market 
uncertainty in more detail in Section 5.2.2.  The marginal productivity of markets, α and β, 
affect the rate at which the markets offer returns and their impact on the allocation decision 
thus depends on the budget available to the monopoly.  For larger budgets (smaller budgets), 
either increasing (decreasing) β or decreasing (increasing) α, makes the emerging market more 
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(less) attractive.  Intuitively, an emerging market initially requires more investment than a 
mature market to achieve a certain return; only for larger investments does the emerging 
market outperform the mature market.  Therefore, if the budget is smaller than a particular 
threshold, then the mature market is more attractive, and once the budget exceeds this 
threshold, the emerging market becomes more attractive. 
So far, we have focused on the allocation decision of a monopoly wherein the firm needs to 
account for the parameters of the market return functions and the available investment budget.  
However, in many instances firm are competing with other firms and project returns further 
depend on the actions of their competitors.  The next section studies the resource allocation 
problem in a duopoly setting and highlights the effect of competition. 
5.2. EFFECT OF COMPETITION – THE DUOPOLY CASE 
In this section we study a duopoly setting where both firms are considering investments into 
projects targeting either the mature or the emerging market.  Each Firm n,  2,1n , decides 
what share, rn, of its budget, Bn, to invest into the mature market.  As in the monopoly case, we 
assume that duopoly firms fully invest their budgets.  We assume that the products or services 
of each firm that are targeting a particular market are considered perfect substitutes in that 
market, i.e., the total market returns depend on the total investment of both firms and follow 
the previously defined return function f(∙) and g(∙).  The returns achieved by an individual firm 
from a particular market are proportional to its investment into that market compared to that of 
its competitor (conceptually, this is similar to Parlar and Weng (2006) where firms’ market 
shares are proportional to the prices they set).  At any given investment level, additional 
investment (including competitive investment) into either market always reduces the average 
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returns obtained from that market (returns divided by investment) because both markets are 
associated with diminishing returns.  Given the mature market’s low rate of marginal 
productivity, diminishing returns are particularly significant.  The proportional allocation of 
returns implies that firms trade off defending their returns in markets where their competitor is 
investing heavily versus opportunistically taking market share in markets where their 
competitor is not investing heavily.  Formally, the expected return of Firm n is: 
 
   
 
   
     ,11
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where r-n denotes the share of the budget that the other firm invests into the mature market.  To 
obtain the reaction function of Firm 1’s optimal investment given the investment decision of 
Firm 2, we set the first order condition of (5.2) with respect to rn to zero: 
 
 
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  (5.3) 
While we were not able to solve (5.3) for rn in the general case, we can now compare the 
allocation decision of the monopoly with that of the duopoly firms.  To facilitate the 
comparison of monopoly and duopoly firms, let us assume BM = B1 + B2, i.e., the total 
combined investment budget of the duopoly matches that of the monopoly.  Given the 
functional form of f(∙) and g(∙), we have the following result: 











, α < β, BM = B1 + B2  










2 rr  (=). 
This theorem says that competition alters budget allocation decisions in a clear direction.  
Under competition, firms overinvest in the mature market.  That is, duopoly firms shift a 
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greater share of their budget from the emerging market to the mature market, which offers 
significant returns for low levels of investment, but with quickly diminishing returns.  Given 
that a monopoly optimizes its resource allocation in a Pareto efficient manner, the strategic 
interactions between firms induce them to reach decisions that are not Pareto efficient and 
obtain lower returns. 
The intuition behind this result is best understood by recognizing that while a monopoly 
can exclusively focus on marginal returns from the two markets, duopoly firms also consider 
average returns (see Proposition 5.A1 in Section 5.5 for a proof of this general result).  We 
illustrate with an example.  Consider Figure 5.2 (where α = 0.1, β = 0.5, a = 1, b = 2, p = 0.6, 
BM = 2, B1 = 1 and B2 = 1), where the monopoly’s optimal investment decision, rM
*
 = 0.095, 
implies an investment of 0.19 (labeled C1 in Figure 5.2) into the mature market and 1.81 (C2) 
into the emerging market, leading to equal marginal returns from both markets (i.e., the slopes 
at these points are identical).  However, given the characteristics of the return functions, the 
mature market provides a greater average return under this allocation.  Although this does not 
affect the monopoly’s decision, average returns are important to duopoly firms due to the 
proportional allocation of returns.   
To understand this result, assume first that duopoly firms invest their budget according to 






, implying an investment of 0.095 by both 
Firm 1 and Firm 2.  This leads to the highest possible combined duopoly return.  However, 
Firm 1 can increase its return by investing more into the mature market.  For example, if  
Firm 1 triples its mature market investment to 3rM
*
, as shown in Figure 5.2, there are two key 
effects: first, the total investment into the mature market increases from 0.19 (C1) to 0.38 (D1), 
thereby increasing the returns from the mature market, while the total return from the emerging 
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market decreases.  Given the Inada conditions and the fact that a monopoly invests at equal 
marginal returns, the total loss of returns from the emerging market is greater than the total 
gain in returns from the mature market.  This reduces the total combined returns, but Firm 1’s 
share from the return from the mature market increases from 0.5 to 0.75, while Firm 1’s share 
from the emerging market return shrinks from 0.5 to only 0.44.  I.e., by sacrificing a 6% share 
of the emerging market, Firm 1 has gained an increase of 25% in its share of the mature 
market.  Although Firm 1 has relinquished a part of the market that is providing larger returns 
(the emerging market), the relative sizes of the lost and gained market shares and the relative 
sizes of the two markets (and thus the average returns in those markets) lead to higher total 
returns for Firm 1.  
This strategy is anticipated by the other firm which, in turn, decides also to shift a greater 
share of its own budget into this market.  As firms shift more resources into the mature market, 
both the marginal and average returns from the mature market decline until an equilibrium is 
reached (E1 and E2 in Figure 5.2).  As depicted in Figure 5.2, both firms invest more heavily 




 = 0.338, ultimately decreasing the 
combined returns of both firms. The nature of competition in this setting engages firms in an 
arms race over the market with greater return per budget unit.   
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 C1 = rM
*









 C2 = (1 – rM
*
)BM D2 = (1 –3rM
*
)B1 + (1 –rM
*
)B2  E2 = (1 –r1
*
)B1 + (1 –r2
*
)B2 
Figure 5.2: Resource allocation of monopoly versus duopoly firms; 
α = 0.1, β = 0.5, a = 1, b = 2, p = 0.6, BM = 2, B1 = 1 and B2 = 1 
Overinvestment into mature markets has been previously documented (Dankbaar, 1998) 
and has managerial implications for managers faced with such a project portfolio management 
problem.  Although duopoly firms could achieve their highest possible return if they each 
invested as a monopoly would, ignoring competitive effects is costly if the other firm acts 
strategically.  Consequently, managers need to recognize that in a competitive setting their firm 
should invest more heavily into the mature market than a monopoly would, acting in the same 
market alone.  The reason is that duopoly firms must consider both marginal as well as average 
returns. 
5.2.1. BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS 
As demonstrated in the previous subsection, the presence of competition affects firms’ budget 
allocation between two markets.  In this subsection, we explore how firms’ budgets affect their 
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own as well as their competitor’s resource allocation decisions.   
To study the impact of the size of firms’ budgets on the resource allocation decisions, 
consider the instance illustrated in Figure 5.3.  In this figure, the optimal investment decision 
of a monopoly (rM
*
) is contrasted with that of two duopoly firms (r1
*
 of Firm 1 and r2
*
 of  
Firm 2).  We fix Firm 1’s budget to 1 and let Firm 2’s budget vary from 0 to 3.  For 
comparison, the budget of the monopoly is set to be equal to the combined budget of the two 
firms in the duopoly case.  The case where Firm 2’s budget is zero corresponds to the instance 
where Firm 1 is a monopoly, in which case r1
*
 = 0.1.  The general observations from Figure 5.3 
are that a firm’s share of budget invested into the mature market is non-increasing in its own 
budget (as r2
*
 is non-increasing in B2) and that an increase in a firm’s budget induces its 
competitor to invest more into the mature market (as r1
*
 is increasing in B2).  This figure 
further supports our insights from the previous subsection, as one can notice that competition 
significantly alters the investment decision of Firm 1, even if Firm 2 has a very small budget.  
Hence, accounting for the presence of competition is critical.  Refining this observation, we 
notice that the share of budget being invested into the mature market is very sensitive to 
changes in the competitor’s budget when it is quite small; however, when the competitor’s 
budget is large, changes to the size of the competitor’s budget have a marginal effect on r1
*
. 
Intuitively, the greater the budget of Firm 2, the more significant the threat is to Firm 1’s 
return in the mature market and the greater the need for Firm 1 to defend this market by 
increasing its own investment into that market.  But, at the same time, the mature market 
quickly becomes saturated as investment increases, leading to poor marginal returns.  These 
counterbalancing factors lead to the tempered response by Firm 1. 
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Figure 5.3: Optimal resource allocation into mature market; 
α = 0.1, β = 0.6, a = 0.8 b = 2, p = 0.5, B1 = 1, BM = B1 + B2 
The insights gained from Figure 5.3 are based on a particular set of market parameters.  
However, these findings are robust.  For example, a reduction in p, the uncertainty associated 
with the emerging market, or a reduction in a, the market potential of the mature market, 
decreases the proportion of budget the firm invests into the mature market at any given budget 
level; however, the relative effects of budget increases still hold. 
These findings can help guide managers as they contemplate their competitive resource 
allocation decision.  We have shown that competition is an important consideration and should 
lead firms to increase their investment into the mature market.  If the competitor is quite small, 
the actual size of the competitor’s budget impacts the allocation decision critically.  However, 
if the competitor’s budget is sufficiently large, the actual size has less of an impact.  Hence, 
facing a large competitor, it is sufficient for managers to respond to competition by defending 
markets with high average returns without having to spend significant resources gaining 
competitive intelligence regarding the exact size of the competitor’s budget.  Changes to a 
firm’s own budget have an even more pronounced effect on its investment strategy.  With a 
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very limited budget, the choice is clear: fully invest in the mature market.  A gradual increase 
in a firm’s budget leads it to significantly increase its investment into the emerging market (as 
the mature market becomes saturated).  Increasing investment into the emerging market, when 
faced with budget increases, maximizes the firms’ expected returns, but, given the uncertainty 
associated with the emerging market, this also increases the firms’ risk exposure.  
Consequently, a firm contemplating an increase in its investment budget needs to recognize 
that an increase in its budget can have two sources of risk: the additional leverage (if 
borrowing is required to achieve the budget increase) and the additional risk exposure that 
results from increased investment into the emerging market.  The next subsection considers the 
effect of market uncertainty more closely.  
5.2.2. EFFECT OF MARKET UNCERTAINTY 
We have characterized the mature market as one that has known investment return projections 
while the emerging market has uncertain returns.  Intuitively, we expect an increase in market 
uncertainty to reduce investment into the emerging market, and vice versa.  Recalling that 1 – p 
is the probability that the emerging market does not provide any returns, we thus expect firms 
to reduce their investment into the emerging market as this probability increases.  Stated 
differently, we expect r to decrease as p increases. Indeed, Figure 5.4, which depicts the 
behavior of r for both monopoly and duopoly as a function of p,  demonstrates that firms 
continue to invest a large proportion of their budget into the emerging market even if there is a 
significant probability that there will be no returns from that market.  As the probability of the 
emerging market achieving its anticipated market potential decreases, firms initially shift 
resources to the mature market at an increasing rate.  However, if this probability is sufficiently 
small, the duopoly firms shift resources to the mature market at a decreasing rate. 
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The monopoly, which generally invests a greater share of its budget into the emerging 
market, is particularly slow to increase investment into the mature market unless the 
probability of receiving no returns in the emerging market becomes extreme. For example, in 
the case presented in Figure 5.4, even if p = 0.1, it is still optimal for a monopoly to invest 0.7 
of its budget into the emerging market.   
 
Figure 5.4: Optimal resource allocation into mature market; 
α = 0.1, β = 0.6, a = 0.8 b = 2, BM = 3, B1 = 2, B2 = 1 
This result implies that risk neutral decision-makers maintain high investment levels into 
the emerging market to avoid saturating the mature market even in the presence of substantial 
market uncertainty.  Only if it becomes highly likely that the emerging market will provide no 
returns, should firms completely avoid the emerging market.   
5.2.3. DIFFERENCES IN MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY 
Recall that α and β, α < β, define the marginal productivity of the mature and emerging 
markets, respectively (technically, they represent the degree of homogeneity of the return 
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functions of these markets).  A low marginal productivity implies that firms quickly experience 
diminishing returns for their investments into this market, while a high marginal productivity 
requires a large investment to obtain the large returns of this market.  As the marginal 
productivity increases, the returns from a market become more linear. As the marginal 
productivity of the emerging market, β, approaches 1, the emerging market provides linear 
returns for any amount of investment.   
Intuitively, one would expect that firms would take advantage of an increase in β by 
decreasing r. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.5, which depicts the allocation decisions, r, for 
both monopoly and symmetric duopoly firms as a function of the marginal productivity of the 
emerging market.  Indeed, when the total of the firms’ budgets is (relatively) high—1.25 
(implying 0.625 for each duopoly firm)—firms monotonically shift their investment from the 
mature market into the emerging market as β, the emerging market’s marginal productivity, 
increases.  The effect of competition emerges as an important factor—the monopoly responds 
faster to an increase in marginal productivity in the emerging market and shifts significant 
resources to the emerging market even when such increase is relatively minor. 
However, changing β does not always imply shifting resources from the mature into the 
emerging market. Since the returns from the emerging market follow the expression g(x)=bx
β
, 
β < 1, the size of investment into the emerging market plays an important role.  Namely, if the 
budget dedicated to the emerging market is high, then a high marginal productivity is 
preferred, while if the dedicated budget for this market is low, then a low marginal productivity 
is preferred.  Thus, if firms have small budgets, they may react differently to changes in the 
marginal productivity. With small budgets, firms may actually shift resources away from the 
emerging market if the marginal productivity of this market increases.  In Figure 5.5, the small 
102 
budget duopoly firms (B1=B2=0.025) monotonically increase investment into the mature 
market as the marginal productivity of the emerging market increases.  The small budget 
monopoly (BM=0.05=B1+B2), initially reduces investment into the mature market as the 
marginal productivity of the emerging market increases, but, as the returns in the emerging 
market become more linear, the monopoly also shifts more of its resources to the mature 
market. This reveals that the firms are more likely to shift resources from the emerging into the 
mature market as the difference in the two markets’ marginal productivities increases, if their 
budgets are sufficiently small. 
 
Figure 5.5: Optimal resource allocation into mature market for different budgets and varying β; 
α = 0.1, a = 0.8, b = 2, p = 0.5  
5.3. OLIGOPOLIES  
We recognize that, in practice, the number of firms competing in markets may well exceed 
two.  In this section, we study the oligopoly setting with N identical firms in the sense that all 
face the same investment decision and have the same budget, with B1 = B2 = … = BN ≡ 
N
OB , 
where the subscript O denotes the oligopoly case and the subscript N denotes the number of 
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firms participating in the oligopoly.  Each Firm n, n = 1,…,N, is seeking to maximize its return 
by deciding what share ri
N




























































,  n = 1, … , N, (5.4) 
where the first term is the return of Firm n from the mature market and the second term is the 
return of Firm n from the emerging market.  Taking the first order conditions of (5.4) and 
imposing symmetry on the firms’ decisions yields: 
          .111 1*1*     NONONONO BrNpbNBNraN  (5.5) 
We have the following result. 











, the oligopoly 
firms’ optimal budget allocation rO
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  (>, <), then 
2
1* Or   (>, <, respectively). 
This result extends the findings from the monopoly case and subsumes Proposition 5.2 (by 
setting N = 1).  The market potential parameters a and b make the respective markets more 
attractive independent of the marginal productivity of the markets and the available investment 
budget.  As before, for larger budgets either increasing β or decreasing α makes the emerging 
market more attractive.  Conversely, for smaller budgets either increasing β or decreasing α 
makes the mature market more attractive. 
The following theorem characterizes the effect the number of competing firms has on 
budget allocation decisions. 
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, and α < β.  As the 
number of competing firms increases from N1 to N2, while the total budget 
of all firms is kept constant such that 21 21 NO
N




O rr  . 
This result directly extends Theorem 5.1 for the special case where firms have identical 
budgets: the more firms compete, the more heavily these firms invest into the mature market.  
Managers need to anticipate that investment into the mature markets will intensify as the 
number of competitors increases.  Consequently, to protect their returns from the mature 
market, firms should increase their own share of investment into such markets. 
Proposition 5.3 characterizes the condition that drives firms to invest a majority of their 
budget into the mature market.  Since competition leads to even higher investment into the 
mature market, firms may end up investing their budget almost entirely into the mature market.  
This, of course, is the optimal decision for each firm individually, but detrimental to the 
combined returns of firms in an oligopoly.  Depending on the market parameters, this dynamic 
may also prevent firms from diversifying their budget over multiple markets, which may 
contradict some firms’ overarching goals of distributing their investments over multiple 
markets and further building a presence in emerging markets. 
5.4. CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
We have studied and demonstrated how competition affects firms’ resource allocation 
decisions.  Our main finding is that while a monopoly optimally considers only the marginal 
returns of the markets, competition drives firms to account for average returns as well.  
Therefore, firms invest more heavily into mature markets which have a lower marginal 
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productivity than emerging markets.  This overinvestment occurs even when competing with a 
firm that is endowed with a small budget.  We find it is critical to assess the competing firm’s 
budget, if this firm is small.  However, if this firm is large, then the actual size of the 
competitor’s budget does not have a significant impact on a firm’s allocation decision.  As 
firms increase their own budget, however, they invest more heavily into the emerging market.  
We have also shown that increase in the marginal productivity of the emerging market 
generally leads to increased investment into this market if firms’ budgets are sufficiently high.  
However, firms with small budgets may instead shift resources to the mature market as the 
marginal productivity of the emerging market increases.  Finally, we have extended the 
framework into an oligopoly setting and have proven that if firms have identical budgets, firms 
invest into the mature market to a greater degree the greater the number of competitors.  
So far, we have focused on settings where firms have project portfolios containing two 
projects.  Through these stylized models, we were able to find tractable results and analyze the 
key impact of competition on the PPM problem.  However, firms often have many projects in 
their portfolio and compete with a number of other firms in many different markets.  In the 
following chapter, we shift to this more general case where a number of budget-constrained 
firms are considering projects that target many different markets. 
5.5. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5 
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Substituting *
*
MM rr   and MM BB   into (5.1), we get 
     1*1* 1     MMMM BrbpBra , which can be rearranged to: 
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We want to show that if α < β and 1 , then 1 .  By contradiction: if we had 1 , 
then 
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.  Following the same 
arguments, α < β and 1  necessitate 1 . □ 
Proof of Proposition 5.2: The monopoly’s optimal decision is the allocation *Mr  that solves 
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1*
Mr  (<, respectively).  □ 




.  Next, we show 






1  .  We conclude by proving the result for the special 
case where both firms have identical budgets. 




.  Comparing the response functions of Firm n and 
Firm –n, using (5.3), we get 
 
  
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Next, we solve (5.P2) for rn: 
     














































Since        04414 222   nnnnnn rrBrBB   for all α < β, we can write 
(5.P3) as 













  , where ε > 0.  This 
leaves two potential solutions,  























 for all α < β, and thus not a feasible solution, the only equilibrium allocation 
is: 
     

















































, we prove that for any given allocation decision by  
Firm -n, the optimal allocation of Firm n into the mature market is always less, i.e. 
     













































This expression holds true if 
 















which can be simplified to 
  .2222 nnnnn BBrBB    (5.P4) 





Now, we prove that the combined optimal allocation of the duopoly firms into the mature 






1  .  The 
equation describing the optimal allocation of Firm n, (5.3), can be rearranged to 
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  (5.P5) 
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First, we show that 
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  (5.P7) 
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^ .  For ^nn rr  , (5.P7) holds and we prove that 
for any r-n we have rn < 
^
nr , or  
        

















 Since the 
numerator of this expression is greater than zero and the denominator of this expression is less 
than zero for any feasible r-n, we have rn < 
^
nr , and thus  
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  And given α < β, we have 
   nnnnnnM BrBrBBr   , (5.P8) 
i.e., the combined investment of the duopoly firms into the mature market is greater than the 
investment of the monopoly. 
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  (5.P9) 
This is the response function for Firm n. We insert the response function for Firm –n to get: 
     
     
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 which has two solutions for rn, 






























.  Given the feasible region of α and β,   1max h , which 
implies that 1  .  Consequently, the symmetric solution Dnn rrr    is the only 
solution if Dnn BBB   . 

























Next, we rearrange (5.1) to 
 
































































































.  Given α < β, we have ** MD rr  , which equates to 
  nnnnnnM BrBrBBr    with Dnn rrr   and  
Bn + B-n = BM. □ 
Proof of Proposition 5.3: This proof follows the same arguments as in the proof of  
Proposition 5.1. □ 
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Proof of Theorem 5.2:  From (5.5), the optimal budget allocation of firms in an oligopoly of 
size N1 is the value of rO
N1*
































O  and that of 
firm in an oligopoly of size N2 is the value of  rO
N2*













































































































































.  Since α < β, we have *1*2 NO
N
O rr  . □ 
The following proposition compares the optimal resource allocation of a monopoly with that of 
duopoly firms if the two markets offer returns according to the general functions f(∙) and g(∙), 
which both follow the Inada conditions. 
Proposition 5.A1: When optimizing its resource allocation over two markets 
with general return functions that follow the Inada conditions, a monopoly 
considers only marginal returns, whereas duopoly firms also account for the 
average return per budget allocation unit of the two markets. 
Proof of Proposition 5.A1:  Using the general return functions f(∙) and g(∙), which both follow 
the Inada conditions, the optimal allocation of a monopoly, rM
*
, is the value of rM that solves 
the first order condition of the monopoly’s return,     MMMMM BrgBrf  1 : 
     MMMM BrgBrf  1'' . (5.P10) 
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To derive analytical results for the general case, we take the first order condition of (5.P11) for 
rn and then impose symmetry such that the firms are identical, i.e., B1 = B2 ≡ BD and  



























i.e., the duopoly firms’ optimal budget allocation depends on the marginal market return 
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, then we have 
    DDDD BrgBrf  12'2' .  However, a monopoly with a budget equal to the combined 
budget of the duopoly firms, BM = 2BD, invests according to (5.P10), 
    DMDM BrgBrf 21'2'  .  Consequently, if 

















then MD rr  . □ 
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6. CPPM FOR LARGE PORTFOLIOS: BUDGET 
CONSTRAINED MULTIMARKET COURNOT 
COMPETITION 
Firms often compete against each other with multiple products in a wide range of markets.  
This is frequently referred to as multimarket contact.  Examples include car manufacturers, 
such as Toyota and GM, that compete in various automotive markets, airlines, such as 
American Airlines and Delta Air Lines, that offer similar services on a number of key routes, 
and consumer packaged goods companies, such as Proctor & Gamble and Kimberly-Clark, that 
compete in a large number of product categories.  Since firms’ budgets and production 
capacities are both constrained, they need to make strategic decisions of how to allocate their 
resources over their products.  In this chapter, we address this challenge in a general setting 
where N firms are competing in S markets. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, we provide the unconstrained 
multimarket Cournot equilibrium benchmark.  In Section 6.2, we introduce the budget-
constrained framework, and derive and characterize the equilibrium production decisions.  In 
Section 6.3, we demonstrate the effect of market abstaining—the case where not all firms 
produce for all markets.  Section 6.4 develops a more extensive model that includes differing 




6.1. UNCONSTRAINED MULTIMARKET COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM 
BENCHMARK 
Consider N firms competing in S independent markets.  Each firm n, ,Nn  determines the 
quantity output of a product, qs,n, to be produced for market s, .Ss   The products produced 
by all  firms for a given  market are perfectly  substitutable.    The price of  the product in  each 








, .s  Following previous work (Shaked and Sutton, 1990; Brander and Eaton, 
1984), we focus on the demand side by assuming that each firm n has the same production 
cost, cn, for all products.   We further assume  cn < as  ,,sn   and for now,  bs = 1 .s   Later, 
in Section 6.4, we relax the assumption that bs = 1 .s   With these assumptions, the profit of 
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ns ,   ,,sn   (6.1) 



































  .n   From (6.1), it is evident  that 
as the number of competing firms increases, firms will reduce their production quantities 
across all markets and achieve lower profits.  As expected, firms produce more (less) for 
markets in which their production costs are low (high) and their competitors’ costs are high 
(low).   
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One implicit assumption in this formulation is that firms have unlimited resources and can 
produce for any number of markets in any profitable quantity.  The total cost of producing the 





































  (6.2) 
Therefore, firms will only produce the optimal production quantity derived in (6.1) if their 
budget is greater than the cost of producing these products, as established in (6.2).  An increase 
in the number of markets or demand growth in those markets results in an increase in the cost 
of producing at these optimal production levels.  Since each firm is not endowed with 
unlimited resources, a critical decision is how to allocate its resources to maximize profit.  The 
next section presents a model in which firms make the same production decision presented in 
this section but have a budget constraint. 
6.2. BUDGET CONSTRAINED MULTIMARKET COURNOT 
EQUILIBRIUM 
Consider the benchmark  model  introduced  in the previous section.  In this section, we impose 






, . Given this budget constraint, each firm n considers the following profit 
















nsn cqB  
0, nsq      .s  
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A key feature of the CPPM problem is that firms are resource constrained. Therefore, we 
assume that firms’ budgets are less than the required total cost of the optimal production in the 








producing at full capacity, ./ nn cB To solve this constrained optimization model with multiple 
decision makers, we assume that firms release strictly positive quantities of product into each 
market, ,0, nsq ns, .  This assumption is relaxed later in Section 6.3.  With these 
assumptions, we can state the following theorem: 
Theorem 6.1: In a multiproduct Cournot competition involving S markets and N firms, 
where each firm n is faced with a budget constraint, Bn, the equilibrium production 
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All proofs are in Section 6.6. 






n  , is the quantity of products produced for each market if the budget 
















, adjusts this average 
production quantity by considering the demand potential in the particular market compared 
with the overall average demand potential and the number of competitors.  The equilibrium 
profit π
*























, can be 
interpreted as the “combined market profit per unit” (if all market demands were aggregated 
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into a single market) multiplied by the production level of the particular firm.  This “combined 


























, is an adjustment factor which is based on the variability in demand 
between the markets and the number of competitors.  Higher variability in demand leads to 
higher profits for firms because it reduces the competition effect: in the extreme case, where all 
markets but one have zero demand, firms have only one market to invest in and competition 
does not affect the production decision (assuming the budget constraint is binding, as defined 
in (6.2)). 
Generally, firms produce in greater quantities for markets with higher demand potentials, 
as captured by the second term of q
*
.  However, there are two key effects which influence the 
degree to which firms adjust their production quantities to the particular market: variability 
between market demands has a greater relative impact on production allocation for smaller 
budgets, which we denote as the “market focus effect”; and the variability between market 
demands has a lesser impact as the number of competing firms increases, which we denote as 
the “competition effect”.  When all markets have the same demand potential,  ,  saas   
neither effect exists and firms produce an equal amount of product for each market. 
To better understand the interplay of these effects when market demands differ, we first 
derive results for the case of firms with symmetric budgets and costs in Subsection 6.2.1 and 
then analyze the case of asymmetric budgets and costs in Subsection 6.2.2. 
6.2.1. EFFECT OF COMPETITION ON FIRMS WITH SYMMETRIC BUDGETS 
In this subsection we explore how competition affects the resource allocation decision of firms 
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with symmetric budgets and costs.  Assuming symmetric budgets, ,  nBB n    and identical 
production costs, ,  nccn  an increase in the number of competitors naturally leads to overall 
higher production capacities.  To isolate the effect of competition, we assume that total 
production capacity across all markets remains the same regardless of the number of competing 








 is fixed for any N.  We then have the following result: 
Proposition 6.1: For a fixed total industry budget B and identical unit costs ,c  
where firms have identical budgets ,/ NBB   increasing N drives firms to 
produce more (less) for markets with higher (lower) than average demand 




















)( .  If market demands are not 
identical, increasing N leads to decreasing profits for individual firms and 

















Figure 6.1 depicts the change in production allocation for B = 1 and ,1c  where each firm 
has three target markets with demand potentials a1 = 2.7, a2 = 2 and a3 = 1.8.  Since 2.2,  a  an 
increase in the number of competitors drives firms to produce more in the first market (above 
average demand potential) and less in the other two markets (below average demand potential).  
The intuition behind this result lies in understanding how the marginal returns of the markets 
change with the number of competing firms.  A monopoly that contemplates its production 
allocation between two markets considers the difference in marginal profits it can achieve by 
shifting units, as well as the resulting changes to the market prices which affects the remaining 
planned production for those markets.  In particular, the price in the market with increased 
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production decreases, thereby lowering the profits of all previously committed products in that 
market. 
This tradeoff is affected by competition: a firm that shifts its production quantity between 
two markets under competition can secure the same difference in profits for this shifted units 
but the effect of the resulting market price changes on the remaining production quantities is 
shared with its competitors.  I.e., the reduction in price experienced in the market with 
increased production is partly burdened by the competitors’ products.  In a budget constrained 
setting, this drives firms to invest more heavily in markets with higher demand potential, and 
thus higher prices, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Total equilibrium production quantities as a function of N; 
 B =1/N, c =1, a1=2.7, a2=2, a3=1.8 
The change in equilibrium allocations caused by competition also changes the individual 
firms’ profits and the industry profits (the sum of all firms’ profits).  As stated in Theorem 6.1, 
firms receive higher profits as the variance between the market demands increases; however, 
the benefit derived from this variance is diminished as the number of firms increases.  If there 
119 
are differences in demands, this leads to decreasing industry profits as the number of 
competing firms increases, even if the total production across all markets remains equal.  This 
is consistent with previous findings (Johnson and Myatt, 2006).  Figure 6.2 depicts this drop in 
profits for the same parameters from Figure 6.1, where the lower curve represents the profits of 
the individual firms and the upper curve represents industry profits. 
 
Figure 6.2: Equilibrium profit as a function of N; B =1/N, c =1, a1=2.7, a2=2, a3=1.8 
6.2.2. EFFECT OF COMPETITION ON FIRMS WITH ASYMMETRIC BUDGETS 
We now turn to the asymmetric setting where firms have different budgets.  We show, through 
an example, that Proposition 6.1 may not hold anymore in the asymmetric case.  Figure 6.3 
presents an instance where all firms have identical production costs ,1c  but Firm 1 has B1 = 
1 and all other firms have Bn = 1 / (N – 1), n ≥ 2, so the aggregate capacity is fixed at a level of 
2 units if N ≥ 2.  Note that B1 > Bn for n ≥ 2, if N > 2.  All firms are allocating their products 
over two markets with demand potentials of 6 and 7.  Figure 6.3 shows how competition 
causes the firms with the smaller capacities to produce more heavily for the high demand 
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market while the firm with the larger capacity produces less for the high demand market and 
more for the low demand market, contrary to the result of Proposition 6.1.  Specifically, as the 
number of firms increases from 2 to 10, the firm with the large budget reduces its production 
into the market with the higher demand potential (Market 2) from 0.67 to 0.55, while the firms 
with the smaller budget increase their total production for Market 2 from 0.67 to 0.91.  
Similarly, in the market with the lower demand potential (Market 1), the large budget firm 
increases its productions from 0.33 to 0.45 while the small budget firms decrease their total 
production from 0.33 to 0.09 as the number of firms increases from 2 to 10.  Intuitively, firms 
with small capacities shift substantial production to high price markets because the burden of 
the resulting reduction in price experienced in those markets will be carried mostly by the firms 
with larger capacities.  However, as small capacity firms drive down the price in these high 
demand markets, large capacity firms shift their production to other markets, as seen in  
Figure 6.3. 
  
Figure 6.3: Equilibrium production quantities as a function of N; 
 B1=1, Bn=1/(N–1) for N>1, c =1, a1=6, a2=7 
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Furthermore, while industry profits decline irrespective of differences in firms’ budgets, the 
individual firms’ profits decline particularly fast for firms with large production capacities, 
while the total profits of all firms with small capacities can actually increase, contrary to  
Proposition 6.1.  Figure 6.4 presents the corresponding profits to the example presented in  
Figure 6.3.  As shown in the figure, total profits of firms with small capacities slightly 
increases as the number of competing firms increases from 2 to 3.  This suggests that it may be 
profitable for a firm to split its budget into smaller parts: for example, if two firms are 
competing with budgets of 1 each (i.e., N = 2), then a firm that splits its budget into two equal 
parts (with autonomous decision makers for each part of the budget) can increase its profits 






*  in Figure 6.4 between N = 2 and N = 3.  However, this 
only holds if a single firm splits its budget; as stated in Proposition 6.1, if firms have 
symmetric budgets, total industry profits decreases as the number of firms increases.  
Therefore, if in the present example, at N = 2, both firms were to split their budgets into two 
equal parts, then both firms would experience reduced profits. 
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Figure 6.4: Equilibrium profit as a function of N; B1=1, Bn=1/(N–1), c =1, a1=6, a2=7 
6.2.3. BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS 
So far, we have assumed that firms’ budgets were fixed.  However, it may be reasonable to 
assume that in certain circumstances firms may be able to adjust their budget (for example, if 
their planning horizon is sufficiently long).  To derive the profitability of increasing the budget, 
one needs to consider the shadow price associated with the budget. The shadow price of the 
budget is the marginal profit of increasing the budget by one unit.  If the shadow price is 
positive, a firm can increase its profit by increasing its budget.  The following proposition 
states the value of the budget’s shadow price. 
Proposition 6.2: If N firms are competing in S markets, then firm n’s shadow 


































The shadow price is determined by the difference of average demand potential and average 
production capacity, where the production capacity of the particular firm is subtracted twice.  
Intuitively, the formula in Proposition 6.2 considers the “average market price” gained by 
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additional production and the reduction of price for the existing products in those markets.  An 
important implication of Proposition 6.2 is that the variance in the demand potentials between 
the markets does not influence the shadow price of a budget increase.  I.e., differences between 
demand potentials across markets influence a firm’s profits (as demonstrated in  
Theorem 6.1) but does not change the marginal profits a firm can expect from increasing its 
budget.  Instead, the additional profit gained by an incremental increase in budget is based 
solely on the average demand potentials, and the current production capacities of all firms.   
Proposition 6.2 also implies that the shadow price of increasing the budget is greater (smaller) 
the smaller (greater) the current capacity of a firm.  Therefore, capacity growth should 
originate mostly from firms with smaller capacities.  Empirical research has broadly shown 
that small firms grow at a higher rate than large firms (Santarelli et al., 2006). 
6.3. MARKET ABSTAINING 
The equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits derived in Theorem 6.1 hold only if  























ns  is valid only if 0
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 ns,  (6.3) 
We now investigate the case where this condition does not hold for all markets and firms.  
From (6.3), one can observe that this condition may not be satisfied for every firm for every 
market, in particular if the difference in demand potentials between markets is high, the 
number of competitors is small, and firms have small capacities.  Intuitively, firms that have 
small capacities can invest heavily into the markets with high demand potential without 
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saturating that market – especially when there are not many competitors in that market.  When 
firms have different capacity levels, some firms may produce for a particular market while 
other firms do not.  In this section, we analyze how these asymmetric production decisions 
affect the equilibrium resource allocation.   
To characterize the solution, we let Ks denote the number of firms not producing for  
market s.  Without loss of generality, we sort all markets by their demand potentials  
(a1 ≤ a2 ≤ … ≤ aS), and all firms by their budgets (B1 ≤ B2 ≤ … ≤ BN).  As in Section 6.2, we 
assume that all firms produce at capacity.  We propose the following conjecture for the 
equilibrium production quantities with market abstaining, .#,nsq   This conjecture can be proved 
to hold for a number of instances.  The case where S = N = 3 is provided in Section 6.6. 
Conjecture 1: If N firms are competing in S markets and not all firms produce in 
all markets, i.e., Ks > 0 for some s, then the equilibrium production quantity of 


































































































SS , for ns, . 
The first two terms of the equilibrium production q
#
 are very similar to the previous 
equilibrium q
*
 with some modification.  The modification adjusts for the budget spent on 
markets with lower demand potentials than the current market considered.  Therefore, for the 
market with the lowest demand potential, a1, the first two terms of q
#
 are identical to q
*
.  For 
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ntnqc  is removed and only the markets 










SS   The third term of q
#
 adjusts the 
production allocation if other firms decide not to invest in a particular market.  Since firms do 





















n  we know that this adjustment amount is always negative.  Intuitively, 
the reduction in competition for a particular market provides firms with an incentive to produce 
less aggressively for this market and instead compete more heavily in the other markets. 
To illustrate the equilibrium production decision proposed by the conjecture, consider the 
following instance, where Firm 1 (the firm with the lowest budget) produces only for  
Market 3 (the market with the highest demand potential) and Firm 2 produces only for  
Markets 2 and 3, and Firm 3 (the firm with the largest budget) produces for all markets.  This is 
clarified in Table 6.1. 
 Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 
Firm 1 q
#
1,1 = 0 q
#
2,1 = 0 q
#
3,1 > 0 
Firm 2 q
#
1,2 = 0 q
#
2,2 > 0 q
#
3,2 > 0 
Firm 3 q
#
1,3 > 0 q
#
2,3 > 0 q
#
3,3 > 0 
Table 6.1: Equilibrium production summary 
We now concentrate on the amounts produced by the firms into the different markets.  
In this example, since Firm 1 is producing only for Market 3, its entire budget is dedicated to 






q  . Firm 2 does not produce at 
 all for Market 1. For Market 2, this firm produces an output equal to 
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  The first two terms 
correspond to the original q* but this amount is adjusted by the third term.  The third term is 
the quantity that Firm 1 “would have” produced for Market 2 under the original q*.  The 
assumption that led to the quantities shown in Table 6.1 is that for each firm n and markets s 
that violates (6.3), we have q
#
s,n = 0.  Since (6.3) was derived from q
*
s,n > 0, we know that third 
term is a negative amount, indicating that Firm 2 is reducing its production allocation for 
Market 2 because there are fewer competitors in this market than anticipated under the original 
equilibrium q*.  This term is then divided by N as part of this amount is absorbed by the 










q  for Market 3.  This means that Firm 2 allocates its remaining budget to the 
remaining market. 










































































into Market 1.  Since neither Firm 1 nor Firm 2 are investing into Market 1, part of their 
anticipated production amount under the original equilibrium q
*
 is added to Firm 3’s 
production.  Since these amounts are both negative (assuming Table 6.1 was constructed by 
setting q
#
s,n = 0 if (6.3) is violated), this implies that Firm 3 reduces production into Market 1 
as a monopolist is expected to.  However, Firm 3 is not producing the monopoly output for this 
market as it faces competition in the other markets. Thus, as it becomes the single supplier for 
Market 1, it adjusts its output downwards, yet, the competitive environments in the other 
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markets limit its actions.  For Market 2, the adjustment is equal to the adjustment made by 
Firm 2, 
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In effect, the conjecture says that firms apply the equilibrium production quantities derived 
in Theorem 6.1 to the markets that are sufficiently profitable.  Since the profitability of markets 
depends on both the demand potentials and the firms’ individual budgets, markets that are 
unattractive to one firm may still attract investment by another firm.  Recognizing the 
opportunity created by the reduction in competition, firms reduce production in markets 
abandoned by other firms in order to raise prices in those markets.    
6.4. BUDGET CONSTRAINED MULTIMARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH 
VARYING COSTS AND DEMAND SLOPES 
In this section, we provide additional insights using a more general model.  Thus far, we have 
restricted the demand slope to be 1 and that we assumed that each firm has the same production 
cost for all different products.  Now, we relax these two assumptions and allow the demand 
slope bs to take any positive value and the unit production cost to differ from product to 
product.  We define cs,n as the unit production cost of firm n for the product targeting market s.  


















nsnsn qcB  
0, nsq      s  
According to Laye and Laye (2008), this extended problem setup has a single solution 
(which can be found with common solvers), but no closed form result has been found.  The 
general case of the budget constrained multimarket Cournot equilibrium adds further 
complexity and counter-intuitive results. We demonstrate by presenting two numerical 
illustrations. 
6.4.1. INCREASING PRODUCTION COSTS MAY INCREASE PROFITS 
Firms generally aim to reduce unit production costs in order to increase their profits.  However, 
in a budget constrained multimarket Cournot equilibrium, we find that in some instances firms 
can increase their profits by increasing their production costs.  This is a particularly interesting 
result because strategically increasing unit costs is typically easier to accomplish than reducing 
unit costs. 
Consider three firms with budgets B1 = 0.3, B2 = 0.4, B3 = 0.6 that are competing in three 
markets with demand potentials a1 = 3, a2 = 4, a3 = 3.5 and demand slopes b1 = b2 = b3 = 1.  
The unit production costs of all firms for all markets is 0.2, leading to the equilibrium 
production quantities and resulting profits displayed in Table 6.2. 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
q1,n 0.37 0.54 0.88 
q2,n 0.63 0.79 1.12 
q3,n 0.50 0.67 1.00 
πn 1.73 2.30 3.43 
Table 6.2: Equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits;  
B1=0.3, B2=0.4, B3=0.6, a1=3, a2=4, a3=3.5, b1=b2=b3=1, cs,n=0.2 ns,   
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As presented in Table 6.2, firms produce for Market 3 proportional to their budgets.  This 
occurs since the demand potential of this market, a3, coincides with the average demand 
potential of all three markets; e.g., Firm 3 has twice the budget of Firm 1 and produces twice 
the amount of product of Firm 1 for Market 3.  As was demonstrated in Figure 6.3, the firms 
with larger budgets (e.g. Firm 3) invest proportionally more into markets with lower demand 
potentials (Market 1) and vice versa.  However, their larger budgets, and thus higher 
production levels, do lead to higher profits.   
We now assume an increase in unit production costs for each firm in all markets, as 
illustrated in Table 6.3.  
 cs,1 cs,2 cs,3 
Market 1 0.25 1.0 1.0 
Market 2 1.0 0.25 0.25 
Market 3 1.0 0.25 0.25 
Table 6.3: New unit production cost parameters 
With costs increasing, we expect profits to decrease, ceteris paribus.  However, in this 
particular instance, the profits of all firms increase.  Table 6.4 shows the new production 
quantities and resulting profits. 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
q1,n 1.2 - - 
q2,n - 0.88 1.28 
q3,n - 0.72 1.12 
πn 1.86 2.41 3.61 
Table 6.4: Equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits with higher production costs; B1=0.3, 
B2=0.4, B3=0.6, a1=3, a2=4, a3=3.5, b1=b2=b3=1, costs as in Table 6.3 
The key to understanding this counter-intuitive result lies in the way firms adapt their 
production decision to competition.  As previously discussed, firms produce more for markets 
with higher demand potentials (and vice versa) but reduce the degree to which they shift their 
production between these markets as the number of competing firms increases.  This 
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consequently leads to lower returns for all firms as was depicted in Figure 6.2.  However, if the 
cost structure of firms is such that it provides certain firms with cost advantages for some of 
the markets, then firms will produce more heavily in those markets.  Depending on the market 
parameters and the firms’ budgets, this can lead to an overall more efficient production 
allocation and thus higher profits for all firms.  The results presented in Table 6.4 demonstrates 
how the change in production costs has led Firm 1 to produce exclusively on Market 1, while 
Firm 2 and 3 focus on the other two markets. 
While many counter-examples can be constructed that demonstrate how cost increases 
generally lead to profit reductions, this section highlights the opportunity that exists in some 
instances to increase profits for all firms by strategically increasing production costs.  In 
particular, such opportunities exist if increases in costs lead firms to specialize in certain 
markets, thus reducing the competition effect that drives firms away from Pareto optimal 
solutions.  This result provides another explanation to why firms are often found to focus on 
certain markets.  While increasing market returns of markets is one explanation (Selove, 2010), 
our work demonstrates that dividing up markets between firms can have advantages for all 
firms, even with decreasing market returns. 
6.4.2. BENEFICIARIES FROM CHANGES IN DEMAND SLOPES 
Typically, a firm that is focusing on producing for a particular market is expected to benefit 
from an increase in demand in that market to a greater degree than firms that are less focused 
on this market or do not produce any product for that market.  However, in this example we 
illustrate that the opposite may occur in some instances.  Consider again three firms that 
compete in three separate markets.  Let us assume that their budgets vary from each other such 
that B1 = 0.03, B2 = 0.21, B3 = 0.52.  Assume the unit production of each firm are identical 
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across the three markets such that cs,1 = 0.1, cs,2 = 0.3, cs,3 = 0.2, for s .  Lastly, the three 
markets have different demand potentials a1 = 3, a2 = 4, a3 = 3.5 but share identical demand 
slopes b1 = b2 = b3 = 1.  The equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits are 
presented in Table 6.5. 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
q1,n - - 0.45 
q2,n 0.21 0.41 1.14 
q3,n 0.09 0.29 1.01 
πn 0.63 1.32 4.86 
Table 6.5: Equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits; B1=0.03, B2=0.21, B3=0.52,a1=3, a2=4, 
a3=3.5, b1=b2=b3=1, c1,1=c2,1=c3,1=0.1, c1,2=c2,2=c3,2=0.3, c1,3=c2,3=c3,3=0.2 
As in the previous example in Subsection 6.4.1, the firm with the largest budget (Firm 3) is 
using a larger share of its capacity for the product targeting the market with the lowest demand 
potential (Market 1) than firms with smaller budgets.  In fact, since Firms 1 and 2 violate (6.3) 
for Market 1, they do not produce any amount for Market 1.   
Assume that the market demand slope of b1 decreases to 0.2, while the slopes of b2 and b3 
both increase to 1.5 and 1.4, respectively.  Since a decrease in the demand slope leads to higher 
prices (at equal production levels), we generally expect a decrease in demand slopes to lead to 
higher profits.  Conversely, demand slope increases generally lead to lower prices and thus 
lower profits in those markets (at equal production levels).  As presented in Table 6.5, Firm 3 
is the only firm to produce for the market experiencing a decrease in its demand slope while 
Firms 1 and 2 are exclusively producing for the markets that are experiencing an increase in 
demand slopes.  This may lead one to expect this change in demands to benefit Firm 3 more 
than Firms 1 and 2.  However, Table 6.6 demonstrates that Firm 3’s profit decreases while the 
profits of Firms 1 and 2 increase. 
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 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
q1,n - - 1.49 
q2,n 0.19 0.38 0.58 
q3,n 0.11 0.32 0.53 
πn 0.64 1.34 4.48 
Table 6.6: Equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits with differing demand slopes; B1=0.03, 
B2=0.21, B3=0.52, a1=3, a2=4, a3=3.5, b1=0.2, b2=1.5, b3=1.4, c1,1=c2,1=c3,1=0.1, c1,2=c2,2=c3,2=0.3, 
c1,3=c2,3=c3,3=0.2 
A comparison between the production quantities of Tables 6.5 and 6.6 reveal that the 
change in demand slopes drives Firm 3 to produce even more heavily in Market 1, thereby 
reducing its production for the markets with the higher demand potentials.  As a result, Firms 1 
and 2 have less competition in Markets 2 and 3 and thus receive higher profits. 
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) have found a similarly counter-intuitive 
instance in a reduced setting where one firm is a monopolist in one market and is competing 
with another firm in a second market.  They showed that a demand shock that raises prices in 
the single-firm market could lower the profit of the firm with access to both markets while 
raising the profit of the firm that only has access to the second market with unchanged demand.  
They found that the key to this result was whether the products of the two firms were strategic 
substitutes or strategic complements.  Our results highlight the counter-intuitive demand 
effects that can occur even without explicitly modeling substitution and complementarity 
effects. 
6.5. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we studied the budget constrained production decision of firms in a competitive 
setting.  Our key contribution is a closed-form solution of the equilibrium production quantities 
and resulting profits for any given number of firms and markets that considers the firms’ 
individual budgets and production costs as well as differences in demand potentials between 
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markets.  The provided solutions clearly demonstrate that competition has a significant impact 
on equilibrium production decisions, in a way that was not a priori obvious.  In particular, 
competition generally drives firms to produce more for markets with larger than average 
demand potentials, thereby reducing industry-wide profits.  In asymmetric settings, large 
budget firms produce in an opposite manner to this general trend and focus on markets with 
low demand potential, thereby benefitting smaller firms.  Our results can help explain counter-
intuitive numerical instances where, for example, an increase in firms’ unit costs leads to an 
increase in profits for all firms. 
6.6. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 6 
Proof of Theorem 6.1: We first derive the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, where the 






















nnsn cqB   0nr  .Nn  
Assuming that firms produce a positive amount into each market, qs,n > 0, and invest their 
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nnsn cqB .  (6.P2) 
We subtract an instance of (6.P1), with n = 1, summed over S from and instance of (6.P1), with 




























































































































































































   (6.P3) 
 
 

































This can be expressed as: 
 1,11, snnns qccrrq     (6.P4) 
Finally, we substitute the value of q1,i and qs,i from (6.P4) into (6.P3): 
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cancelling terms and using (6.P2): 
























































































ns  is the 
unique Nash equilibrium production quantity for NnSs  , .  

























, , we have: 
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n   (6.P5) 
We have assumed that budgets are below the total production cost of the unconstrained 
equilibrium, defined in (6.2).  Given the symmetry assumptions of this proposition, (6.2) 
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s aaS  is a measure of variance and cannot be 











































































































































































Proof of Proposition 6.2: The shadow price rn is the KKT multiplier for the budget constraint 
from Theorem 6.1.  Specifically, (6.P1) defines the shadow price of firm n’s budget constraint.  




























ns , into (6.P1) we have: 
 
   

























































































































































































































 .Nn  □ 
Proof of Conjecture 1 for one instance: We prove the special case defined in Table 6.1.  
Without loss of generality, we sort all markets by demand potential such that a1 < a2 < a3 and 
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   NnSTs n   ,,..1  
and by expanding the terms: 
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and by (6.P9): 






































































   NnSTs n   ,,..1  (6.P12) 
Apart from the trivial case, q3,1, we prove the Conjecture only for q2,2.  The other cases can be 
shown using similar logic and the full proof can be obtained upon request from the authors. 
If 01,21,1  qq , then (6.P8) implies 11,3 Bq  . 
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which always holds true. □ 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this thesis we explore analytical models of the project portfolio management problem under 
competition.  We demonstrate that competition can significantly affect firms’ resource 
allocation decisions, sometimes in a counter-intuitive manner. 
In Chapter 3, we develop a CPPM model in which two firms make binary investment 
decisions to either invest into a mature market or into an emerging market.  We demonstrate 
that even in this simple model, there are many possible investment dynamics between the two 
firms that affect the optimal timing of the decision, the long term considerations and the 
communication strategy.  If firms have asymmetric budgets, the number of possible 
interactions increases even further and we show numerically the counter-intuitive result that 
that a firm might be better off when the competitor’s budget increases. 
Chapter 4 adds further complexity to the initial model.  Returns from the emerging market 
are assumed to be uncertain and firms decide whether to invest early, thereby subjecting 
themselves to that uncertainty, or to delay investment until the uncertainty is resolved.  
Furthermore, firms are restricted to invest in one market only, but can decide how much to 
invest into their target market.  We are able to prove that the existence of two investment 
projects in the portfolio can lead firms to strategically delay investment, even if there is limited 
uncertainty in the market.  Contrary to the single project setting, which is well explored in the 
real option literature, our setting provides firms with the flexibility to wait without conceding 
the leadership position to its competitor.  However, we also prove that if diffusion effects are 
high, firms may need to make decisions in a Prisoner’s Dilemma type situation which can lead 
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them to invest too early.  Finally, we develop a straight-forward ration that can allow managers 
to make decision in a timely and effective manner. 
In Chapter 5, we proceed to continuous investment decisions where firms decide how to 
allocate their limited budget over the available projects.  We prove that while a monopoly 
optimally only considers the marginal returns of the markets, competition drives firms to 
account for both marginal and average returns.  Therefore, firms invest more heavily into 
mature markets which have a lower marginal productivity than emerging markets.  This 
overinvestment occurs even when competing with a firm that is endowed with a small budget.  
We find it is critical to assess the competing firm’s budget, if this firm is small.  However, if 
this firm is large, then the actual size of the competitor’s budget does not have a significant 
impact on a firm’s allocation decision.  As firms increase their own budget, however, they 
invest more heavily into the emerging market.  For the special case where firms have identical 
budgets, we show that further increases in competition lead firms to invest even more heavily 
into mature markets. 
Finally, Chapter 6 explores the most general setting where N firms compete in S markets.  
We prove a closed-form solution of the equilibrium production quantities and resulting profits 
for any given number of firms and markets.  The solution considers the firms’ individual 
budgets and production costs as well as differences in demand potentials between markets.  
Using this result, we are able to clearly demonstrate the effect of competition on the allocation 
decision and prove that competition between firms with identical budgets drives them to 
produce more for markets with larger than average demand potentials, thereby reducing 
industry-wide profits.  If firms’ budgets differ, large budget firms produce in an opposite 
manner to this general trend and focus on markets with low demand potential, thereby 
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benefitting smaller firms.  Our results can help explain counter-intuitive numerical instances 
where, for example, an increase in firms’ unit costs leads to an increase in profits for all firms. 
While this thesis provides a number of insights into the CPPM problem, several aspects 
remain open for further research.  For example, some markets may provide increasing returns, 
which could lead to different investment strategies.  In addition, firms may not only differ with 
respect to the size of their budgets but their investment into a market may also influence 
market demands in different ways.  For example, a firm such as Apple may increase market 
demand to a greater degree than another firm in an emerging technology market such as the 
tablet market.  Furthermore, years of research in PPM have revealed a number of other factors 
that can be important to an investment decision: investment projects may be interrelated in 
terms of their costs or expected returns, projects may be targeting short-term vs. long-term 
objectives, and projects may differ with respect to how well they fit into the overarching goal 
of a firm.  Deriving insights from a model that incorporates these additional complexities into a 
CPPM model would be highly useful to decision makers who are currently forced to make 




APPENDIX A: MAPLE CODE 
CPPM: BINARY INVESTMENT DECISIONS – CODE FOR FIGURE 3.3 
> Prison := l/(2*ln(k)/b+1/x); 
> Chicken := l/(-ln(1/(2*k))/b+1/(2*x)); 
> Stag := l/(-2*ln(2/k)/b+2/x); 
> Hero := l/(ln(k)/b+1/x); 
> Mature := b/(2*ln(2)); 
> Emerging := l*b/(2*ln(2)); 
> plot(eval([Prison, Chicken, Stag, Hero, Emerging, [Mature, x, x = 0 .. 8]], {b = 1, k = 4, l = 
10}), x = 0 .. 8, y = 0 .. 8, labeldirections = [horizontal, vertical], labels = ["P , investment 
into M", "P , investment into E"], axes = "framed", font = [times, 16], axesfont = [times, 16], 
thickness = [2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0], legend = ["eq. (1)","eq. (2)","eq. (3)","eq. (4)","",""], linestyle = 
[solid, dot, dash, dashdot, solid, solid], color = black) 
CPPM WITH UNCERTAIN RETURNS: WHEN, WHERE AND HOW MUCH TO INVEST – CODE 
LEADING TO FIGURE 4.3 
> MM := (u[M]-c)^2; 
> ME := (u[M]-c)^2; 
> EM := (v+u[E]-c)^2; 
> EMS := s[E]; 
> EE := (2*v+u[E]-c)^2; 
> EES := s[E]; 
> MMEML := -u[E]+c+(1/2)*sqrt(2)*u[M]-(1/2)*sqrt(2)*c; 
> MMEMD := -v^2-2*v*u[E]+2*v*c-u[E]^2+2*u[E]*c-(5/9)*c^2+(4/9)*u[M]^2-
(8/9)*u[M]*c; 
> MMEMI := (1/3)*c-u[E]+(2/3)*u[M]; 
> MMEEL := (1/2)*u[M]-(1/2)*u[E]; 
> MEEML := u[M]-u[E]; 
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> MEEEL := -(1/2)*u[E]+(1/2)*c+(1/2)*sqrt(2)*u[M]-(1/2)*sqrt(2)*c; 
> MEEEI := -(1/2)*u[E]-(1/4)*c+(3/4)*u[M]; 
> MEEED := (5/4)*c^2+(9/4)*u[M]^2-(9/2)*u[M]*c-4*v^2-4*v*u[E]+4*v*c-
u[E]^2+2*u[E]*c; 
> EMEEL := (1/2)*sqrt(2)*(-u[E]+c); 
> EMEEI := u[E]-c; 
> EMEED := (7/5)*v^2-(2/5)*v*u[E]+(2/5)*v*c-u[E]^2+2*u[E]*c-c^2; 
> MMEMF := -(3/4)*c^2+(1/4)*u[M]^2-(1/2)*u[M]*c-v^2-2*v*u[E]+2*v*c-
u[E]^2+2*u[E]*c; 
> MMEEF := (1/4)*u[M]^2-(1/2)*u[M]*c-v^2-v*u[E]+v*c-(1/4)*u[E]^2+(1/2)*u[E]*c; 
> MEEMF := u[M]^2-2*u[M]*c-v^2-2*v*u[E]+2*v*c-u[E]^2+2*u[E]*c; 
> MEEEF := (3/4)*c^2+u[M]^2-2*u[M]*c-v^2-v*u[E]+v*c-(1/4)*u[E]^2+(1/2)*u[E]*c; 
> EMEEF := -(3/4)*u[E]+(3/4)*c; 
> MMEEDF := MMEEF; 
> MEEMDF := MEEMF; 
> MMEEIL := MMEEL; 
> MEEMIL := MEEML; 
> EECEEF := (7/36)*(-2*v-u[E]+c)^2; 
> EELEEF := (1/4)*(-2*v-u[E]+c)^2; 
> EELEED := (1/8)*(-2*v-u[E]+c)^2; 
> EECEMM := (7/9)*v^2-(2/9)*v*u[E]+(2/9)*v*c-(5/9)*u[E]^2+(10/9)*u[E]*c-(5/9)*c^2; 
> EMLEED := -(7/4)*v^2+(1/2)*v*u[E]-(1/2)*v*c+(5/4)*u[E]^2-(5/2)*u[E]*c+(5/4)*c^2; 
> vu[M] := 1.35; 
> vu[E] := 1; 
> vc := .5; 
> plot([eval(MEEMDF, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E], u[M] = vu[M]}), [eval(MEEMIL, {u[E] = 
vu[E], u[M] = vu[M]}), v, v = 0 .. 50], eval(MEEEF, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E], u[M] = vu[M]}), 
eval(MMEMD, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E], u[M] = vu[M]}), eval(MEEED, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E], 
u[M] = vu[M]}), [eval(MEEEI, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E], u[M] = vu[M]}), v, v = 0 .. 50], 
eval(EMLEED, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E]}), eval(EELEED, {c = vc, u[E] = vu[E]})], v = 0 .. 
.75, s[E] = 0 .. 1.5, legend = ['MEEMDF', 'MEEMIL', 'MEEEF', 'MMEMD', 'MEEED', 
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'MEEEI', 'EMLEED', 'EELEED'], color = [yellow, gold, turquoise, red, blue, navy, green, 
plum], legendstyle = [font = [Times, Roman, 8]], axes = boxed); 
CPPM: CONTINUOUS INVESTMENT DECISIONS - CODE FOR FIGURE 5.3 
> with(plots); 
> Eq5b := (r2*B1*B2+r1*alp*B1^2)*a*(r1*B1+r2*B2)^(alp-2)-((1-r2)*B1*B2+(1-
r1)*bet*B1^2)*b*((1-r1)*B1+(1-r2)*B2)^(bet-2); 
> Eq5 := eval(Eq5b, {B1 = B2, B2 = B1, r1 = r2, r2 = r1}); 
> Eq5M := alp*a*(r3*B3)^(alp-1)-bet*b*((1-r3)*B3)^(bet-1); 
> xlistbet := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistbet := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistr1 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistr2 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistr3 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrD1 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrD2 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrM1 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrM2 := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrD1x := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrD2x := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrM1x := Array(1 .. 50); 
> ylistrM2x := Array(1 .. 50); 
> i := 2; 
> for B2 from .2 by .1 to 3 do 
i := i+1; 
xlistbet[i] := B2;  
ylistr3[i] := fsolve(eval(Eq5M, {B3 = 1+B2, a = .8, alp = .1, b = 1, bet = .6}) = 0, r3); 
ylistbet[i] := fsolve(eval({Eq5, Eq5b}, {B1 = 1, a = .8, alp = .1, b = 1, bet = .6}), {r1 = 
0 .. 1, r2 = 0 .. 1}); temp := ylistbet[i];  
ylistr1[i] := solve(temp[1]-r1, r1);  
ylistr2[i] := solve(temp[2]-r2, r2);  
ylistrM1x[i] := ylistr3[i]*(1+B2);  
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ylistrM2x[i] := (1-ylistr3[i])*(1+B2);  
ylistrD1x[i] := ylistr1[i]+ylistr2[i]*B2;  
ylistrD2x[i] := 1-ylistr1[i]+(1-ylistr2[i])*B2;  
ylistrM1[i] := eval(a*x^alp, {a = .8, alp = .1, x = ylistrM1x[i]});  
ylistrM2[i] := eval(b*x^bet, {b = 1, bet = .6, x = ylistrM2x[i]});  
ylistrD1[i] := eval(a*x^alp, {a = .8, alp = .1, x = ylistrD1x[i]});  
ylistrD2[i] := eval(b*x^bet, {b = 1, bet = .6, x = ylistrD2x[i]})  
> end do;  
> unassign('B2'); 
> ylistr1[1] := .1016302723; 
> ylistr1[2] := .2674162666; 
> ylistr2[1] := 1; 
> ylistr2[2] := 1; 
> ylistr3[1] := fsolve(eval(Eq5M, {B3 = 1+0, a = .8, alp = .1, b = 1, bet = .6}) = 0, r3); 
> ylistr3[2] := fsolve(eval(Eq5M, {B3 = 1+.1, a = .8, alp = .1, b = 1, bet = .6}) = 0, r3); 
> xlistbet[1] := 0; 
> xlistbet[2] := .1; 
> display(plot([seq([xlistbet[i], ylistr3[i]], i = 1 .. 31)], B[2] = .2 .. 3, r[j] = 0 .. 1, axes = boxed, 
color = black, linestyle = ["dot"]), plot([seq([xlistbet[i], ylistr1[i]], i = 1 .. 31)], B[-n] = .2 .. 3, 
r[j] = 0 .. .3, axes = boxed, color = black), plot([seq([xlistbet[i], ylistr2[i]], i = 1 .. 31)], axes = 
boxed, color = black, linestyle = ["dash"]), font = [family, style, 13], labelfont = [family, style, 
13], caption = "Figure 3: Optimal resource allocation into mature market; &alpha; = 0.1, 
&beta; = 0.6, a = 0.8, b = 2, p = 0.5, B  = 1, B   = B  +B  "); 
CPPM: BUDGET CONSTRAINED MULTIMARKET COURNOT COMPETITION – CODE FOR 
FIGURE 6.1 AND FIGURE 6.2 
> q2 := B/(3*N)+(a[s]-(a[M]+a[E]+a[G])*(1/3))/(N+1); 
> plot(eval([(eval(q2, a[s] = a[M]))*N, (eval(q2, a[s] = a[E]))*N, (eval(q2, a[s] = a[G]))*N], 
{B = 1, a[E] = 2, a[G] = 2.7, a[M] = 1.8}), N = 1 .. 10, Q = 0 .. 1, labels = ["number of firms 
(N)", "equilibrium industry production (Q)"], labeldirections = [horizontal, vertical], color = 
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black, axes = boxed, linestyle = ["solid", "dash", "dot"], font = [times, 12], captionfont = 
[times, 14]); 
> profit2 := B*(a[M]+a[E]+a[G]-c-N*(B/(N*c)))/(N*c*S)+(S*(a[M]^2+a[E]^2+a[G]^2)-
(a[M]+a[E]+a[G])^2)/(S*(N+1)^2); 
> plot([eval(profit2*N, {B = 1, S = 3, c = 1, a[E] = 2, a[G] = 2.7, a[M] = 1.8}), eval(profit2, {B 
= 1, S = 3, c = 1, a[E] = 2, a[G] = 2.7, a[M] = 1.8})], N = 1 .. 10, Pi = 0 .. 1.7, axes = boxed, 
labels = ["number of firms (N)", "equilibrium profit (&pi;)"], labeldirections = [horizontal, 
vertical], color = black, linestyle = ["solid", "dash", "solid", "dash"], font = [times, 12], 
captionfont = [times, 14]); 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF NOTATIONS 
ALL CHAPTERS 
N number of firms 
n subscript for firm n 
S number of markets 
s subscript for market s 
M mature market 
E emerging market 
πn profit of firm n  
Bn budget of firm n 
CPPM: BINARY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
Pn,s project investment opportunity of firm n into market s 
zs total investment by all firms into market s 
as maximum return potential of market s 
bs twice the inflection point of market s 
vn,s binary decision variable of whether firm n invests into market s (v=1) or not (v=0) 
α relative difference in return potentials (aE/aM) 
β relative difference in inflection points (bE/bM) 
r proportional share of investment made by Firm 1 vs. Firm 2 (B1/[B1+B2]) 
CPPM WITH UNCERTAIN RETURNS: WHEN, WHERE AND HOW MUCH TO INVEST 
tn timing decision of firm n 
sn market decision of firm n 
I invest early 
D delay investment 
kn capacity expansion of firm n 
cn unit cost of firm n 
ps linear price function for market s 
As demand intercept for market s 
μs mean market demand of market s 
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σ variance of emerging market demand  
x number of firms investing in emerging market (early or delayed) 
v diffusion effect of each firm in emerging market 
Δs mean demand minus unit cost of market s 
CPPM: CONTINUOUS INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
f(x) market returns from mature market given total investment x by both firms 
g(x)  market returns from emerging market given total investment x by both firms 
a market potential of mature market 
b  market potential of emerging market 
α marginal productivity of mature market 
β marginal productivity of emerging market 
p probability that emerging market will reach its market potential 
rn share of firm n’s budget that it invests into mature market 
CPPM: BUDGET CONSTRAINED MULTIMARKET COURNOT COMPETITION 
qs,n production quantity of firm n into market s 
Qs total production quantity of all firms into market s 
as demand intercept of market s 
cn unit production cost of firm n 
Cn total cost of production in unconstrained setting 
rn shadow price of budget constraint 
Ks number of firms not producing for market s 
cs,n unit production cost of firm n for market s 
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